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ABSTRACT 
 
Roads from War: Challenges to Afghanistan’s Rural Infrastructural Development 
 
by 
 
Clifford Joel Schwankl 
 
 Rural access infrastructural development projects in post 2001 Afghanistan represent 
a vital component of the economic recovery of the state.  This thesis examines four of the 
most prevalent of these projects implemented by the World Bank, and in doing so 
substantiates the significant challenges faced by both the international development aid 
community and domestic implementing agencies.  These challenges not only impact the 
efficiency and outcomes of these rural access projects, but are also significantly observable 
across a broader set of infrastructural development and rehabilitation programs throughout 
Afghanistan.  While these issues are certainly exacerbated by the austere operational climate 
of the region itself, referring to ongoing conflict, government capacity and legitimacy 
limitations, and economic instability, they should more accurately be understood as 
symptomatic of greater structural contradictions within contemporary “development” 
paradigms.  The future success or failure of Afghanistan’s economic recovery will depend on 
the international aid community’s ability to aggressively reform its aid goals and success 
indicators, facilitate domestic institutional agency in establishing and realizing development 
goals, and definitively separating aid goals and operations from military ones. 
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Intro: 
 For much of the last decade, Afghanistan has been a focal point of international 
“post-conflict” state development and reconstruction efforts in South Asia.  These efforts, 
which have been both necessitated and facilitated in equal measure by western military 
operations throughout the region since 2001, have been among the most comprehensive in 
recent history.  Vital to the success of Afghanistan’s overall recovery from decades of war is 
the effective and timely infrastructural development of its rural regions, which at once house 
the majority of its population and its most impoverished social demographics.  This 
infrastructural development, and in particular the provision of rural access infrastructure, 
represents at once one of the most important and most risk-laden elements to the state’s 
future growth.  Several key questions arise when critically analyzing these projects’ current 
state of affairs.  What is the intended role of “rural access” aid projects in the international 
aid community’s “development” plans for Afghanistan?  What structural factors, 
epiphenomenal to both contemporary international aid practices and the geopolitical situation 
within the state, affect the observed outcomes of these projects?  What does this variance 
look like?  Are these projects and other like them lost causes, or can they potentially be 
reformed?  If so, how? 
 Because of the state’s ongoing conflict and regional insecurity, persistent issues of 
governmental corruption and capacity limitations, economic vulnerability born of weak 
exports and a heavy reliance on illicit opiate production, and growing dependency on 
international monetary aid flows, rural access development acts as a necessary prerequisite 
for economic recovery.  This is because it holds the potential to provide access to much 
needed social services to rural populations, such as hospitals and education, while 
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simultaneously facilitating regional trade and incentivizing increased agricultural 
diversification away from poppy farming.  However, vulnerabilities due to the exposed 
nature of the projects involved, in addition to serious structural challenges to their successes, 
have collectively subjected rural access development operations to a number of recurring and 
significant challenges. 
By first identifying some of the most prominent theoretical criticisms of 
contemporary international “development” aid, specifically the relative inability of 
International Aid Organization’s to adapt their development doctrines to their theaters of 
operation, the contemporary entanglement of counterinsurgency warfare with development 
policy, and the problematic nature of the “liberal development” paradigm itself, the 
challenges and inefficiencies faced by rural access programs in Afghanistan can be more 
deeply understood and accurately addressed.  Not only are these challenges readily 
observable within the project case studies addressed herein, they are also have a measurable 
adverse effect on a broader spectrum of   projects within the state.  Analysis of four 
prominent rural access development case studies, the National Emergency Employment 
Program, the National Emergency Employment Program for Rural Access, The National 
Emergency Rural Access Program, and the Afghanistan Rural Access Program, reveals that 
these operational challenges are being mitigated with highly varying degrees of success.  The 
application of the modal challenges affecting the case studies presented herein to a broader 
set of infrastructural development projects in the state reveals that they are common and 
represent critical topics for future study. 
Ultimately, the challenges faced by rural access projects in contemporary 
Afghanistan, along with the broader “development” of the state across the many sectors of its 
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society and economy, are symptomatic of greater and problematic contradictions within 
current international development paradigms.  Understanding and attempting to address these 
challenges on the state level in bold and insightful ways is a valuable step in the direction of 
revising the way in which the international aid community interfaces with its target states.   
Ch 1: A Critical Analysis of “Post Conflict” Development 
Conducting development and reconstruction operations in a state such as Afghanistan 
offers unique challenges to the responsible international agencies and domestic governmental 
institutions alike.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the “post conflict” nature of the state, 
or more accurately the ongoing instability of the state and its economy produces a number of 
distinct obstacles to reconstruction and development efforts.  Ongoing provincial conflict 
renders all efforts to safely access and improve upon rural infrastructure and society an 
extremely difficult task.  This task is made all the more difficult by the government of 
Afghanistan’s (referring here to the Ghani administration) ongoing legitimacy crisis among 
the state’s heterogeneous body politic, and the resulting limits to the state’s capabilities and 
influence.  The state’s historical reliance on illicit opiate agriculture and the general 
weakness of the domestic job market and export economy significantly handicaps organized 
efforts to establish new legitimate trade and industry. 
While all of these factors significantly impede the progress of development in 
Afghanistan, they are not solely the products of the austere economic and social operating 
environments found therein.  Rather, many of these challenges are perpetuated, or at the very 
least exacerbated, by problematic structural contradictions within development processes and 
institutions themselves.  There are three principal areas in which structural contradictions to 
“post conflict development” can be identified.  First, the organizational roles and structures 
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of international development organizations inhibit their ability to properly or appropriately 
engage with their target states.  Second, the contradictory nature of “liberal development” 
and intervention paradigms championed by the United States and major international 
development institutions such as the World Bank affect negative outcomes on their target 
states such that the development process can become undermined.  Finally, the modern 
marriage of development and military policy in “counterinsurgency” campaigns notably 
hinders their mutual effectiveness.  The purpose of this chapter is to identify some of the 
more abstract, rather than concrete or logistical, sources of development challenges as they 
appear in post-2001 Afghanistan. 
1.1 Development Cooperation: Conceding Structures and Institutional Inertia 
One of the factors that most immediately dictates the outputs of international 
development organizations such as the World Bank is the operational structure and cultural 
history of the organization itself.   There are unmistakable selection biases observable in the 
recruiting of the technocratic base of these organizations, referring specifically to their 
educational origins and theoretical economic assumptions, and the bureaucracy through 
which their program designs are processed produce significant constraints on outputs that 
deviate from the ‘party line’.  
Ngaire Woods addresses the rise and role of policy consensus in the World Bank in 
her work The Globalizers: The IMF, World Bank, and their Borrowers, and specifically in 
the chapter entitled “The Globalizing Mission”.  Woods asserts that the need for stabilization 
and adjustment policy consensus within international organizations such as the World Bank 
arose out of the late 70’s and early 80’s Latin American debt crisis, and the subsequent and 
increasingly coordinated international organization lending strategies designed to regulate 
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debtor monetary policy adjustment (Woods 2006, p. 53).  According to Woods, the 
‘Washingtonian’ nature of this consensus in the World Bank was derived in a de facto 
manner from the staff majority who had received their economics training in the United 
States, Britain, and Canada (Woods 2006, p. 54).  This majority voice, along with its relative 
economic methodological homogeneity, has rendered a preponderance of World Bank 
lending and projects policies since the early 1980’s in line with utilitarian, neoclassical 
economic strategy. 
This effect, according to Woods, has been co-opted by the hierarchical and 
bureaucratically centralized World Bank institutional structure to produce operational 
practices that are characterized by both “professionally” reductionist case analyses and high 
degrees of policy conformity (Woods 2006, p. 55).  Woods asserts that this Washington 
Consensus has been further codified into long-term World Bank practice by the significant 
levels of institutional inertia that international organizations of its kind are subject to.  This is 
exemplified in the failure of both the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to 
foresee or mitigate the 1994 economic and currency crash in Mexico.  Here, despite 
numerous warning signs, the Bank and IMF maintained their public approval of Mexican 
economic reforms, as they do currently with the Afghani currency despite its recent 
weakness.  Woods argues that this policy complacency is derived from the unstable nature of 
the relationship between international lending organizations and their client states; the IMF 
and World Bank cannot openly report negatively on member-states for fear of breaching 
confidentiality based cooperation or “catalyzing the very crisis they would hope to avoid” 
(Woods 2006, p. 58). 
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Woods reaches significant conclusions regarding the origins and practical operational 
intractability of adjustment and lending policy consensus in international organizations, and 
particularly in the World Bank.  This consensus, which has been salient as a binding source 
of economic methodology, has been derived primarily from international organization staff 
recruitment majorities originating in mainstream western academia throughout the latter 
portion of the 20th century, most of whom presumably espouse definitive neoliberal 
understandings of lending and adjustment policy practices.  Despite all of this, Woods takes 
care to remind her readers that international organizations such as the IMF and World Bank 
(and certainly the Asian Development Bank) should not be mistaken to be unaware of the 
flaws inherent in their prescriptive operational procedures.  It is admitted, Woods says, that 
the simplicity of the models with which these international organizations interface with 
member states fails to account for contextually specific variables of their states’ political 
economy (Woods 2006, p. 64).  Woods is acutely aware of this “gap”, and of the need to 
address it if the Washington Consensus is ever to be reassessed. 
 Another structural factor that makes problematic the successful realization of 
international development goals carried out by institutions such as the World Bank is the way 
in which these goals are determined to begin with.  Specifically, the large scale and often 
universalized nature of these development goals makes it enormously difficult for them to be 
met in the real world.  Perhaps the most relevant example to this sort of generalistic 
development envelope is the United Nations Millennium Development Goals.  First adopted 
at the 2000 United Nations Millennium Conference, these goals include the following: 
eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender 
equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat 
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HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, develop a global 
partnership for development (UNDP, MDG’s). 
 As Steve Berkman observes, the Millennium Development Goals and others like 
them as they are adopted by the World Bank represent a very damaging cognitive dissonance 
between declared donor interests and feasible goals for development in the real world 
(Berkman 2008, p. 259).  Berkman’s pessimistic conclusion, one that unfortunately strikes 
close to home for many of the near-failed states in which the Bank is mandated to operate, is 
that the World Bank and the international development community at large may simply be 
unwilling to concede that there is a certain substantial degree to which their operational 
effectiveness in realizing tangible “development” is limited – by establishing virtually 
unattainable goals they are tacitly acknowledging their inability to meet them (Berkman 
2008, p. 259).  Sebastian Mallaby similarly criticizes the “overpromising” of the World Bank 
with regard to its declared development goals; the real resulting problem is that these goals 
ultimately go on to dictate substantive development strategies employed by the Bank in real 
world operations when it would be significantly more effectual to set a more controlled, 
finite series of goals specific to the actual needs of the states in which they are operating 
(Mallaby 2004, p. 311). 
1.2 Liberal Development and Intervention in a Critical Spotlight 
 In addition to purely institutional factors mentioned in the previous section, such as 
institutional inertia along regionally nonspecific economic policy lines and organizational 
disincentives to deviate from or report negatively on these programs, there is a significant 
literature that argues for a more basic, structural source of contradictions in contemporary 
development policy.  This literature posits that the normatively hegemonic international 
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interventionist paradigms that govern modern development efforts are responsible for 
producing and maintaining a number of stark contradictions between the motivations, means, 
and ends of development projects in the “underdeveloped” world.   
Afghanistan has been on the blunt receiving end of a focused, multilateral 
development aid effort on the part of the international community for the last 13 years.  This 
effort, in addition to being one of the most costly and controversial monetary investments of 
the global north, has represented one of the most comprehensive state building efforts in 
recent memory – perhaps analogous in scope and scale only to the development push 
following the Second Gulf War in Iraq.  Given the multiplicity of development aid programs 
currently at work within the state, coupled with the high degree of commitment shown by 
key Western actors such as the United States to the success of the newly reestablished 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, it is somewhat surprising that tangible positive change 
within the state has been affected to a limited degree at best.  Moreover, the largely 
unmeasured and almost wholly ignored connotative negative consequences that will likely 
accompany this international development aid have the dangerous potential to unbalance the 
newly formed state altogether.   
 In order the more fully understand the problems associated with development 
processes such as those currently at work within the Afghani state, it is necessary to first look 
to the greater issues surrounding normatively prevalent multilateral (and even 
nongovernmental) aid disbursement formations.  Numerous authors, including William 
Easterly and Mark Schuller, engage with the various faults of mainstream development aid 
organizations that are observable in contemporary Afghanistan such that they offer valuable 
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insight into the operational failings, both direct and indirect, that this aid is likely to 
encounter.   
These criticisms, however, are more than mere conjecture and attempts at forecasting 
development aid effectiveness – the historical precedent of such programs’ failure has been 
well documented and analyzed in other theaters around the globe.  Dambisa Moyo’s work 
entitled Dead Aid, which chronicles the cumulative failings of multilateral development aid 
in Africa throughout the last three decades, offers a valuable comparison to the Afghani case.  
More than just mirroring the current development aid trajectory of Afghanistan, this look into 
the challenges experienced throughout Africa’s aid cycle provides an invaluable look into the 
likely future of the Afghani state should these programs continue in their present forms. 
William Easterly’s White Man’s Burden attempts to illustrate the inadequacies of 
current international economic development doctrinal practices.  At its most basic, Easterly’s 
work sets out to make a critical distinction between two divergent development aid 
modalities, which he identifies as “planners” and “searchers” (Easterly 2007, p. 5-7).  For 
Easterly, planners can be understood to be macro-level orchestrators of international aid, 
such as leading multilateral institutions and policy makers in the global north.  These 
planners operate on a “top-down” basis, and engineer large, if not holistic and utopian, sets of 
development goals.  For Easterly, perhaps the best example of a “planner” at work would be 
the United Nations “Millennium Development Goals” (or MDG), which make broad, 
sweeping targets for socio-economic progress (Easterly 2007, p. 9).  
The problem with programs of this nature, Easterly asserts, lies in the degree to which 
they are removed from contextual understandings of on-the-ground realities – realities that 
dictate the relevance and potential effectiveness of operationalized development policy.  
10 
 
Searchers, on the other hand, operate conversely in a “bottom-up” manner.  First and 
foremost they seek out information and understanding of a locality, and then subsequently 
engage with any issues present on a largely individual basis (Easterly 2007, p. 12).  The 
difference, then, between planner and searcher programs would be analogous to the 
difference between goals to ‘end global poverty’ or to ‘develop the Afghani state’ and goals 
to improve water sanitation in a single southern Afghani province respectively. 
  In substantiating his claims about the dangers and inadequacies of “planner” policies, 
Easterly wants to emphasize that economic development and government building projects 
cannot, by their very nature, be imposed in a systemic manner by external actors.  This 
“legend of the Big Push”, as Easterly calls it, which would suggest that poverty and 
governmental inefficacy thresholds can be broken if enough currency or institutionalized 
foreign aid is rendered in a struggling country, has little by way of historical precedent to 
support its claims.  Instead, Easterly wants to caution his readers that market-building efforts, 
such as those engaged in by institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank, rarely take hold in impoverished nations because these operational theaters and their 
respective socio-economic idiosyncrasies are rarely understood by outside mediators of 
change (Easterly 2007, p. 61).   
Easterly’s main criticisms tend to be leveled at structural adjustment plans, generic 
policy changes notionally designed to improve economic performance that often overlook or 
even contradict existing socio-economic norms in the developing countries in (Easterly 2007, 
p. 96).  Easterly is similarly critical of democracy building programs; he claims that a lack of  
effective accountability structures and overly-rapid democratization plans are never going to 
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be as effective as the organic development of democratic civil society on a local level 
(Easterly 2007, p. 117).   
All of these criticisms are, even by a conservative approximation, highly accurate 
when applied directly to the Afghan case.  Given the volatile sociopolitical nature of the 
state, as dictated by its ongoing and unevenly contained civil conflict between coalition 
forces and a variable oppositional force composed of Taliban hold-outs and various foreign 
insurgent groups from proximal regions, it is hardly surprising that nearly all development 
aid rendered in Afghanistan is of a “hands off” nature.  The liabilities involved with 
allocating resources and personnel to carry out what Easterly would consider to be “searcher” 
operations would be astronomical.  In  this sense, the nature of the Afghani case almost 
dictates that international development aid be restricted to a set of “planner” modalities.  
The second part of Easterly’s book is devoted to identifying various issue 
endogeneities to planner development models.  First, he looks at the structurally dictated 
ineffectiveness, and perhaps even inappropriateness, of bureaucratic development institutions 
and their operational models.  Here, the relationships between aid principals (or policy 
making actors), agents (or bureaucratic organizations charged with carrying out aid policy), 
and the actual targets of aid policy are characterized by a number of seemingly irresolvable 
operational challenges (Easterly 2007, p. 169).  Specifically, he discusses the obscuring 
complexity of the systems through which aid is disbursed, the negligible degree to which 
principals are held accountable for the outcomes (both positive and negative) of aid 
programs, the excessive breadth and vagueness of aid direction operationalization, and the 
dangerous degree to which these development policies are designed to instrumentally benefit 
the principal actors’ interests.  Easterly contextualized this discussion with an examination of 
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IMF policy in the developing world, paying particular attention to the consequences of state-
dept bailout and high conditionality loan programs such as IMF extended credit facilities 
(EFC’s).  Perhaps the most striking part of this discussion concerns IMF programs in heavily 
indebted poor countries (or HIPC’s), where historically IMF programs have caused cyclical 
aid dependency rather than economic development (Easterly 2007, p. 230-232). 
Mark Schuller echoes these criticisms in his work Killing with Kindness, which 
engages with the critical issues surrounding operational inefficacy as a result of intra-
structural contradictions in NGO-based international aid, all of which are also applicable to 
multilateral-sponsored development aid programs within Afghanistan.  One such 
organizational challenge is the degree to which organizations facilitate and utilize the 
participation of aid recipient populations in the actual process of aid rendering.  Generally, 
Schuller observes that despite the superficially greater degree to which some organizations 
are able to involve aid recipients in the operational process relative to their counterparts, aid 
workers and recipients alike found mechanisms of local involvement to be more tedious and 
inefficient than not.  For Schuller, the fact that aid workers “fell like they are only carrying 
heavy rocks” when interfacing with aid recipients could have any number of causes – most of 
which likely stem from socio-economic disparity between aid workers and recipients and the 
resulting variance in perception (Schuller 2012, p. 72). 
Schuller discusses the consequence of the “top down” power in dictating aid 
organization operational autonomy, namely, the degree to which aid organizations often find 
themselves in a position of compromised autonomy as a result of policy subordination to 
donor agencies (such as USAID) (Schuller 2012, p. 134).  This criticism holds true even for 
multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, which are held to the 
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operational doctrines of their organization regardless of their respective applicability to a 
place such as contemporary Afghanistan, let alone the degree to which they are subject to the 
political pressures of powerful actors such as the United States. 
Ultimately, Schuller concludes that the structural inefficacies of aid organizations can 
be traced to their common “human” element: their leadership and operational mandate is 
inherently flawed on a bounded rationality basis (Schuller 2012, p. 174).  This distinctly 
human ineffectiveness, with all of its consequential operational contradictions, works in 
concert with high levels of macro-level organizational pressure to neutralize the potential of 
aid organizations for enacting salient positive change.  This effect, which Schuller names 
“trickle down imperialism”, occurs as the result of socially imposed incentive structures 
within aid organizations to maintain “party line” policy, regardless of its actual operational 
relevance to the theater in which it is being actualized (Schuller 2012, p. 183).  Despite the 
notional benevolence that no doubt motivates these aid structures, the poor degree to which 
the aid they are rendering is actually relevant and effective leads Schuller to the titular 
revelation of his work: aid organizations are, in fact, “killing [albeit inadvertently] with 
kindness”. 
The third part of White Man’s Burden draws two broad parallels for analysis:  first, 
Easterly draws a comparison between contemporary development efforts and old 
imperialism; and second, he illustrates the similarities between contemporary western (and 
particularly American) military interventions and international development programs.  
When discussing the likeness of contemporary “development aid” to older, more overt forms 
of imperialism, Easterly points out  
[that the White House’s] Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stabilization [‘s]…mandate is not to rebuild old states…but to create 
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“democratic and market oriented” new ones…sometimes rebuilding [a former 
US ambassador] explained, means “tearing apart the old”. (Easterly 2007, p. 
270) 
 
Easterly is justifiably critical of this sort of cavalier attitude in matters of international 
economic adjustment and aid disbursement.  He posits that, just as there is little or no 
precedent for old European colonial projects improving local economies in the long term, 
these new neo-imperial forms of democratic state-building will similarly fail.   
 In no state could this critique be more relevant than in contemporary Afghanistan, 
where the degree to which development aid has been conflated with a greater military 
counterinsurgency campaign has rendered it largely hollow and insincere.  The distinctly 
military nature of these development and aid disbursement efforts draws into question, just as 
Easterly posits, whether or not international attentions in Afghanistan are being rendered for 
the purpose of helping its people, or in the interest of creating a new market oriented and 
resource rich state that is amenable to exploitive western trade practices. 
 All of these criticisms are certainly troubling given their apparent relevance to the 
Afghani case.  Significantly, there is nothing particularly unique or unexpected with regard to 
these ominous forewarnings of future problems that can conservatively be associated with 
current development aid formations.  In fact, the outcomes of such formations are readily 
observable throughout regions of the global south in which such formations have historically 
been established.  South America and South Korea have already briefly been mentioned; 
however perhaps the most analogous case study for comparative analysis to contemporary 
Afghanistan is Africa at large since the 1980’s. 
Dambisa Moyo’s Work entitled Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How There is 
a Better Way for Africa provides a detailed historiography and critical evaluation of foreign 
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aid rendered in the African continent throughout the second half of the 20
th
 century and in the 
first decade of the 21
st
.  Moyo begins her discussion by counter-positing the substance of her 
argument with the superficially optimistic appearance of contemporary African economic 
growth; she points out that over the past five years many African economies have 
demonstrated annual rates of GPD growth in the realm of 5%, that export commodity process 
have prompted state revenues, and that African stock market liquidity – though low by 
international standards – is exhibiting outwardly positive rates of annual growth (Moyo 2010, 
p. 3-4).   
However, Moyo immediately appends these observations by asserting the central 
argument of her work: that poverty in the African continent, and particularly in its sub-
Saharan areas, continues to exist in unprecedented yet ever-increasing levels despite 
international aid efforts, and indeed may even be exacerbated by aid efforts themselves 
(Moyo 2010, p. 6).   
 Before moving to her discussion of specific doctrinal inefficacies of international aid, 
Moyo provides her readers with a fairly detailed historiographical account the formation of 
contemporary international aid structures and practices.  Moyo aptly breaks the progression 
of post World War II aid structures into seven broad historical periods: Bretton Woods in the 
1940’s, the Marshall Plan in the 1950’s, 1960’s industrialization, the normative shift towards 
combating poverty in the 1970’s, governmental stabilization and structural adjustment in the 
1980’s, and present-day institutional inertia in African aid (Moyo 2010, p. 10).  At its most 
basic, this historiography illustrates a general shift regarding international conceptions of aid 
from its originally intended purpose as a tool of post-war reconstruction to more recent ideas 
about its utility as a mechanism of economy building and foreign poverty intervention.  In 
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this sense, Moyo largely echoes Easterly’s arguments regarding the instrumental nature of 
“planner” development aid. 
For Moyo, it seems as though international aid in Africa took its first significant 
wrong turn in the 1970’s when it shifted its focus from infrastructural development through 
direct lending from western powers and multilateral monetary institutions such as the World 
Bank and the IMF towards poverty reduction-focused aid strategies (Moyo 2010, p. 17).  
These increased aid disbursements, coupled with the vast increases to international loan 
interests rates that characterized the international political-economic climate in the late 70’s 
and early 80’s, placed much of Africa deep within a cycle of foreign aid dependency – these 
states remained unable to pay off their loans because of a lack of any real economic progress 
and, as a result of unfavorable investment horizons, were forced to assume new debts to pay 
off old ones (Moyo 2010, p. 18).  These aid program inefficacies were codified in a sense 
during the 1980’s, when Washington Consensus-aligned structural adjustment plans were 
enacted to address aid programs’ perceived point of failure: governance incapacity and 
corruption (Moyo 2010, p. 24).  As Moyo points out, these aid disbursement conditionalities 
were largely ignored by target governments and, because aid continued to flow regardless, 
levels of corruption and relative infrastructural incapacity abounded. 
Moyo attributes the failure of these contemporary aid measures to “a confluence of 
factors: geographical, historical, tribal, and institutional” (Moyo 2010, p. 35).  However, she 
does specify several specific ways in which aid programs have failed.  Unlike the Marshall 
Plan of post-war Europe, Africa lacked (and continues to lack) base-level infrastructure to 
effectives and accountably redistribute foreign aid disbursements (Moyo 2010, p. 36).  Moyo 
argues that this foundational incapacity has encouraged aid money to stagnate in the hands of 
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state officials and local elites, rather than matriculating down to the public economy at large.  
As previously mentioned, Moyo blames African aid failure to a certain extent on unenforced 
by consistent association of aid disbursements with high degrees of conditionality, as well as 
the nearly systemic conflation of aid loans and grants among target governments (Moyo 
2010, p. 40-41).  For Moyo, these factors directly encourage the misappropriation and 
ineffective allocation of aid assets.   
Most importantly, however, Moyo identifies the corruption-aid dependency cycle as 
being the factor that has most significantly dictated the failure of contemporary aid.  Here, 
corrupt governments that are characteristic of many impoverished nations are depicted as 
acting in a self-interested manner, allocating aid towards institutional entrenchment and 
preservation and thus increasing economic opacity and institutional inertia, and as a result 
increasing levels of poverty that will in turn prompt increased levels of international aid 
(Moyo 2010, p. 49).  This vicious cycle, coupled with untenable loan interest rates and 
overly-long loan terms, disincentivize accountable state-led economic development.  These 
similarities between the current situation in Afghanistan and that of Moyo’s 1980’s-90’s 
African case study are shocking for both their breadth and depth 
In his work, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the 
American World Order, G. John Ikenberry asserts that the contemporary position of the 
United States within the international system is best characterized as a situational crisis of 
authority (Ikenberry 2011, p. xii).  This crisis, though not at all new, has been mounting with 
increasing rapidity and to great consequence during the last two decades as a result of a 
structure he refers to as the “hegemonic liberal order” (Ikenberry 2011, p. 71).  The 
determinant mechanism of this “order” was rearticulated by Noam Chomsky in Hegemony or 
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Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance, the titular argument of which states that 
contemporary American foreign policy has exceeded its normatively defined bounds of 
authority by compromising the balance between hegemonic control and international 
perceptions of legitimacy (Chomsky 2003, Ch. 2).  This critical conception of American 
Foreign policy and its various contemporary outcomes certainly hold when applied to the 
Afghan case. More than that, however, it suggests that the contradictory and self 
undermining development structures currently at work within the state are in fact systemic 
failures epiphenomenal to western foreign development practice – failures that are largely 
dictating the recurring issues of conflict development we observe in places such as 
Afghanistan.  There are numerous theories of conflict dynamics capable of accurate 
inferential description when applied to the Afghan case 
Ted Gurr offers one such theory regarding the socioeconomic behavioral patterns 
responsible for galvanizing a populace into a state of civil conflict.  Gurr asserts that “relative 
deprivation”, as a result of disequilibrium between social perceptions of value expectations 
and material value capabilities, forces a populace into conflict as a function of maximized 
expected utility (Gurr 2011, p. 24).  In Afghanistan, relative deprivation has in many ways 
come to define the socio-economic realities of state development.  As will be discussed in 
greater depth later on, ongoing international development efforts in the region rely heavily 
upon western coalition military support.  This “military function” of development in the 
state, though necessary, reduces the material bounds of local value capabilities – the 
populace is unable to capitalize on development benefits fully when their state is in a 
situation of perpetual war – causing continual disparities between those value capabilities and 
aggregate value expectations.  The net effect is a feedback loop of violence. 
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 A similar model, also drawing upon the principle of maximized expected 
utility, is posited by Jack Synder and Robert Jervis as a means of theoretically modeling 
conflict longevity.  For Synder and Jervis, intrastate conflict duration is best understood as 
the consequence of a security dilemma between embattled actors (Synder and Jervis1999, p. 
18).  This model, despite the fact that it is typically used to describe reciprocal relations 
between nation-state actors in an anarchic international system, is applicable at the intrastate 
level (especially in situations of internal conflict) because of pseudo-anarchic state of the 
theater in question.  In Afghanistan specifically, coalition forces and their developmental 
institutional counterparts are unable to reach a settlement with insurgent forces that is 
amenable to all parties because of the credible commitment problems that ensue from the 
intrastate security dilemma.  Barbara Walter describes this phenomenon in her work 
Committing to Peace: the Successful Settlement of Civil Wars by asserting that structural 
problems of conflict resolution implementation render involved parties unable to reliably 
commit to agreement operationalization (Walter 2001, p. 5).  This occurs because any one 
actor’s concession towards successful resolution implementation increases the others’ 
relative capabilities for counterattack, thus leading to a situation in which no actor is able to 
securely proceed towards their communal end goals.   
Walters “credible commitment theory” is surprisingly applicable to the Afghan 
security and development situation (Walter 2001, p. 53).  The willingness of rural Afghan 
populations to commit themselves to development programs is dependent on their flagging 
confidence in those programs’ ability to practically provide alternatives superior to their 
current conditions.
1
  Simultaneously, development institutions and coalition military forces 
                                                 
1
 This is readily evident when observing the difficulties faced by organizations such as the United Nations 
Office of Drugs and Crime in trying to shift the agricultural base of Afghanistan away from illicit substance 
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calculate the degrees to which they are willing to see development projects through towards 
completion as a function of domestic-institutional compliance and overall risk.  Here, as Paul 
Amar astutely observes in his work The Security Archipelago: Human Security States, 
Sexuality Politics, and the End of Neoliberalism, the security formations that dictate the 
counterproductive behaviors of international development and coalition military apparati 
within the state are in fact being produced by those very same institutions and their presence 
on the ground (Amar 2013, p. 21).  In Afghanistan, for example, since the 2001 coalition 
military invasion much of the insurgent violence has taken place in direct response to the 
continued presence of western military forces.  In this way, there is a distinct positive 
feedback loop of sorts that mandates the increased securitization of the state, as well as the 
constriction of foreign intervention in state development strategy.  These mutually dependent 
processes have the potential to run one another into the ground, as becomes evident when 
exploring contemporary Afghan security state, sociopolitical, economic, and international 
development formations. 
The significant degree to which the development of the underdeveloped world as a 
project has been co-opted as an issue of security, rather than retaining its status as an issue of 
quality of life or human rights, is of particular importance here.  For Mark Duffield, this 
transformation is rooted in the normative shift in North American and European foreign 
policies that occurred in the early 1990’s in the wake of the Cold War.  Here, policy 
paradigms realigned themselves away from deterrence and strategic power balancing towards 
securing what Duffield calls “liberal peace”, which represents a conflation of humanitarian, 
economic rehabilitation, and societal reconstruction with state security and rule of law, all of 
                                                                                                                                                       
based crop ventures, such as Poppy and derived opiate products, towards international legitimate agricultural 
outputs.  Ultimately, the relative costs of these licit crops in many ways continue to outweigh their benefits 
relative to their competing, illicit alternatives.  
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which constitute “a radical development agenda of social transformation” (Duffield 2001, p. 
11).   
Development, which in some classical sense can be understood to be an economic 
rather than a social enterprise, becomes inextricably tied to the notion of security in 
interventionist western foreign policies.  This is because development, even in an explicitly 
economic sense, will necessarily alter the socioeconomic status quo of “underdevelopment”, 
and the resulting imbalances tend to generate conflict; all the while, this conflict overtly 
undermines development processes by affecting instability on the state, and must therefore be 
addressed and minimized as an explicit extension of development policy (Duffield 2001, p. 
38, 40).  One of the most significant and interesting manifestations of this overt conflation of 
development and security policy is the United Nation’s 1998 Strategic Framework for 
Afghanistan (SFA), which sought to jointly render humanitarian aid and promote political 
stability and amelioration in the state while it was still subject to Taliban rule (Duffield 2007,  
p. 138).  As Duffield points out, the contradictory nature of these two policy imperatives is 
reflected in the degree to which each was compromised to support the other: 
The role of aid within the SFA was to rebuild civil society, create local 
constituencies for peace and, at the same time, encourage the acceptance of 
moderation and democratic representation among political actors – it was 
concerned with changing and modulating behavior.  The aim was not to support 
the state per se but, indirectly, to empower self reliant groups and communities 
as responsible political actors – in other words to create conditions for internal 
political change. (Duffield 2007, p. 143) 
 
In this way, aid under the SFA, and to a certain degree its successor the 2001 United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, is intended to manufacture political change along a 
predetermined  liberal trajectory, and therefore can be correlated with political 
factionalization and instability within the state (Duffield 2007, 138).  While this does not in 
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any way point to the futility, irrelevance, or progressiveness of political liberalization for a 
state like Afghanistan, which quite to the contrary suffered greatly under the illiberal and 
repressive rule of the Taliban, it does reflect the inefficiency and mutually undermining 
nature of attempting to combine a liberalizing or securitizing agenda with aid or 
development.   
The result, as Kamala Visweswaran puts it, is a situation in which coalition military 
forces must settle for maintaining a status quo of “violent peace” in which significant 
improvements to state security, and by extension state development, are unlikely to 
impossible in the short term as a result of violence and instability (Visweswaran 2013, p. 11).  
The focus of occupying forces in these situations necessarily shifts from development and 
infrastructural improvement towards pacifying potential sources of instability and 
compromised security, which in turn fosters a greater response from insurgent oppositional 
forces - thus the cycle continues.
2
 
1.3 Development by Warfare; Warfare by Development 
 The aforementioned conflation of development and security as a factor that is 
mutually inhibiting and contradictory goes beyond theoretical abstractions, political rhetoric, 
and macro-level policy aims.  Rather, there is a significant degree to which development and 
modern “counterinsurgency” warfare as a manifestation of security policy have become 
entangled with, and undermine the effectiveness of one another on a strategic or even tactical 
level.  Much of this inefficiency is bound up in the challenges of fighting a counterinsurgent 
                                                 
2
 A fair example of this, and one the Visweswaran uses in her book Everyday Occupations: Experiencing 
Militarism in South Asia and the Middle East, would be the military coalition occupation of Iraq following the 
2003 invasion led by the United States.  Here Visweswaran points to the tendency for prolonged military 
occupational operations to devolve into high-civilian casualty crucibles (Visweswaran, p. 27-28).  
Expeditionary operations that were initially rendered against and limited to military targets become increasingly 
collateral in nature as their opposition transforms from uniformed state targets to a disgruntled and increasingly 
radicalized civilian population. 
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military campaign to begin with, let alone the attempt to consolidate inherently chaotic 
warfighting strategies with productive development policy outputs. 
 Counterinsurgency (COIN) encompasses an immensely complex and relatively 
incoherent set of military strategies that have been designed and redesigned for use by 
conventional, modern military forces such as that of the United States against 
nonconventional, often guerilla resistance movements like the Taliban in Afghanistan.  
Current United States military COIN doctrine is enumerated in the US Army Field Manual 
on Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24) published in 2006, which represents the first substantial 
expansion of US Department of Defense COIN operational procedure since the Vietnam War 
(FM 3-24 2006, p. V).  While the core of US COIN doctrine is firmly centered on the 
struggle to win the support of an indigenous population, COIN is most accurately defined in 
negative terms as a concerted military and political effort to oust insurgent oppositional 
forces who threaten state legitimacy via guerilla, propaganda, political and other tactics (FM 
3-24 2006, p. 1-2, 28).
3
 
 Unfortunately, these objectives are far easier expressed than accomplished.  Even in a 
theater of operations such as Afghanistan, whose population under Taliban rule endured 
among the most repressive and austere standards of living  internationally, the challenges 
faced by a foreign occupying force in winning indigenous support and establishing a new and 
legitimate government are both numerous and immense.  In his work The Failures of 
Counterinsurgency: Why Hearts and Minds are Seldom Won, Ivan Eland enumerates some of 
                                                 
3
 In reality, these objectives are typically articulated and carried out as a set of ‘best’ and ‘worst’ practices.  Per 
FM 3-24, best practices of COIN include: emphasizing intelligence, focusing on the populations needs and 
security, establishing and expanding secure areas, isolating insurgents from the populace, conducting 
information operations, providing amnesty and rehabilitation for those willing to support the government, 
expand, train,  and prioritize the role of host national police forces over foreign COIN assets, deny sanctuary to 
insurgents by securing host nation borders, protecting key infrastructure (FM3-24, p. 1-29). 
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the most historically prevalent difficulties faced by COIN forces, including: the lack of a 
precedent-setting, historically successfully, coherent COIN doctrine that can be replicated; 
the lack of consensus among experts and strategists on the best ways to combat insurgents 
without damaging local relations; armed insurgency is typically motivated by an underlying 
grievance among indigenous populations, and attempting to stifle it may in fact exacerbate it; 
foreign occupation tends to foster resentment among indigenous populations, thus 
exacerbating insurrection; historically, insurgents have successfully overthrown far more 
powerful conventional military opponents; counterintuitively, guerilla war tends to favor the 
lighter, more mobile, even less sophisticated warfighting technologies of insurgents over the 
highly mechanized forces of COIN occupiers; prolonged conflict favors insurgents, who use 
the extended presence of occupying COIN forces as political justification for their cause 
(Eland 2013, p. 8-14). 
 For the purposes of this thesis, these difficulties and the subsequent failures of 
counterinsurgent warfare are significant because of the considerable degree to which COIN 
has become entangled and conflated with state development policies and programs.  This is 
particularly true in states such as Afghanistan, where prolonged and continuous conflict 
requires that any and all development efforts be made simultaneously (and therefore 
integrated with) COIN military operations.  As Gian Gentile points out, “FM3-24 
acknowledges that counter-insurgency is synonymous with state building when it says that 
‘successful counterinsurgencies support or develop local institutions with legitimacy and the 
ability to provide basic services, economic opportunity, public order, and security’” (Gentile 
2014, p. 243).  There is perhaps no better example of this interdependence of COIN and 
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development operations than that of the coalition Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT’s) 
in Afghanistan.   
Created in 2002 by the United States, PRT’s act as a component of coalition military 
operations in Afghanistan and are intended to “use development aid and advisory assistance 
to restore Afghan governance and win the hearts and minds of local populations” (Jackson 
2014, p. 93).  These teams, which are “commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel and consisted of 
between 60 and 100 personnel” to include representatives from the “US Department of State, 
US Agency for International Development, and the US department of Agriculture”, represent 
a clear and overt marriage between military and reconstruction operations, or between 
development and security (Jackson 2014, p. 92).  Notably, this conflation between 
development and security has proven in many ways to be the only viable option when 
engaging with a state such as Afghanistan, as only these PRT’s and other similar instances of 
cooperative military and development operations have the ability to safely access the state’s 
most rural and dangerous provinces, locations that incidentally are often within the greatest 
need of aid (Christie 2013, p. 57).   
However viable this sort of marriage between development and security operations 
may seem given the severity of Afghanistan as a theater of operations, its fatal flaw is that the 
interconnectedness of these two processes allows for the significant spill-over of one’s 
shortcomings and inefficiencies into the other.  More specifically, development in the rural 
provinces of Afghanistan becomes susceptible to many of the same operational difficulties 
associated with fighting a counterinsurgent military campaign.  As Douglas Porch observes, 
most “insurgent-ravaged” states that demand a counterinsurgent response are, by nature, 
unsuited to the distinct type of liberal capitalism that is the ultimate end-state of most 
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western-led state development ventures (Porch 2013, p. 331).  At the very least, the inflated 
reliance of development processes on military support and infrastructure demands the 
continued role and significant presence of military forces in the state, both as facilitators of 
development and as a security force to protect state assets and infrastructure.  As Jeffrey 
Michaels reiterates, increased military presence in a state such as Afghanistan subject to 
insurgent warfare has the propensity to further exacerbate the insurgency and handicap the 
smooth growth of local economies, an effect that commands little attention from military 
officials and policy makers (Michaels 2014, p. 58). 
 These effects are exacerbated by the religious fundamentalist nature of contemporary 
Afghanistan’s insurgencies.  If, as was previously discussed, one the factors that makes 
insurgencies particularly intractable is the fact that they draw strength from organized 
military attempts to quash them, then this phenomenon holds doubly true in situations where 
insurgent forces rely on religious justifications for their resistance in the first place.  Mark 
Juergensmeyer refers to this type of religiously justified conflict as “cosmic war”, stating that 
the absolute and uncompromising nature of religious beliefs in these circumstances, when 
applied to conflict, yield situations in which yielding to military defeat is tantamount to 
yielding one’s idealized religious beliefs (Juergensmeyer 2000, p. 157).  According to 
Juergensmeyer, this manner of “cosmic war” will likely develop when three conditions are 
met: when “the struggle is perceived as a defense of basic identity and dignity”; when “losing 
the struggle would be unthinkable”; and when “when the struggle is blocked and cannot be 
won in real time or on real terms” as in any military struggle against insurmountable odds 
(Juergensmeyer 2000, p. 164-165). 
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 Unsurprisingly, the negative effects of these trends are readily observable throughout 
Afghanistan’s contemporary history, and especially so when examining the rise of the 
Taliban to power in late 1994 and its subsequent behaviors and impacts on western-led 
liberal development in the region.  In his 2001 work entitled Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and 
Fundamentalism in Central Asia Ahmed Rashid asserts that the Taliban very much arose out 
of a context of international intervention in the state, rather than manifesting organically from 
within, as a direct response to perceived external epistemic threats to an idealized form of 
Islamic society.  This is both significant and relevant because it not only highlights the modal 
negative consequences of intertwining warfare and development doctrines, but because it 
also illustrates the ways in which religious beliefs and rhetoric can be co-opted to combat 
these types of situations and exacerbate their negative consequences in the long run. 
According to Rashid, the Taliban initially took root in the state in the wake of the 
Soviet Union’s withdrawal in 1989, taking full advantage of the relative political and socio-
religious power vacuums that followed.  During this time, the state was highly factionalized 
along political and religious lines between numerous competing warlord fiefdoms (Rashid 
2010, p. 21).  On the most basic level, Rashid asserts that the rapid political rise of the 
Taliban in the face of this power vacuum can be understood as the product of long standing 
American  CIA and Pakistani ISI organizational and military support, which prominently 
took the form of arms and funding disbursements in the interest of undermining the Soviet 
occupation of the state (Rashid 2010, p. 85).  The United States had, and continues to have to 
this day, significant vested interests in the stability of the region because of its high 
geographic potential as an oil pipeline route connecting the Caspian Sea’s oil reserves to the 
international market at large (Rashid 2010, p. 176).   
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Following their rise to power in 1994, the Taliban as the majority religious voice in 
the state espoused (for essentially the first time) a fundamentalist rhetorical position with 
regard to not only their views of the role of religion in society, but also to their extreme and 
militant refusal to accommodate perceived western notions of culture and modernization 
(Rashid 2010, p. 93).  These views represent at their most basic level a reciprocal negative 
response to perceived external existential threats.  Much like the previously held discussion 
of the negative effects of counterinsurgents on conflict longevity as a result of indigenous 
societies’ perceptions of foreign militants as encroaching existential threats, the Taliban’s 
fundamentalist religious stance in Afghanistan caste western intervention in an existentially 
threatening negative light, further generating negative domestic sentiment and resistance to 
successful aid interventions. 
Similarly, the Islamic extremist group Al Qaeda, also present in Afghanistan 
throughout the late 20
th
 century and the beginning of the 21
st
, exemplifies the ways in which 
religious beliefs and rhetoric can further highlight the cultural and strategic pitfalls of liberal 
development doctrines as they are combined with modern counterinsurgent warfare.  Al 
Qaeda, which Oliver Roy depicts as adopting and “Islamasizing” many of the anti-imperialist 
and anti-capitalist rhetoric of prominent 1970’s “Third Worldist” social movements, 
ultimately chose to engage with social and economic issues surrounding western imperialist 
culture and neoliberal international development as existential threats to absolute notions of 
religious truth (Roy 2006, p.324-325).  In doing so, Al Qaeda like the Taliban adopted a 
position that is fundamentally incompatible with liberal development, and is predisposed to 
prolonged conflict when that same liberal development is delivered through military-based 
counterinsurgency doctrines. 
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Ch 2: The Political Economy of War and Development in Afghanistan 
Afghanistan’s economic development, which has been spearheaded by international 
lending and monetary aid organizations such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, 
and International Monetary Fund, was virtually nonexistent immediately prior to 2001 due to 
the intractability of the state’s socio-political climate under Taliban rule.  Given the volatile 
nature of the state’s military and political history, it is unsurprising that recently 
reinvigorated international economic development efforts have been plagued by challenges, 
both internal and external to the Afghan state apparatus itself, even after the removal of the 
Taliban from power.  Despite these challenges, Afghanistan has demonstrated a superficially 
optimistic economic and sociopolitical development trajectory as indicated by moderately 
high levels of annual GDP growth between 2001 and 2012.  These “successes” of 
Afghanistan’s economic development, however, are proving to be both short lived and 
largely overwhelmed by the political-economic challenges currently facing the state. 
2.1 State Builders: Warfare and Foreign Intervention 
The contemporary security situation (2001-present) of Afghanistan has come to 
dictate to a large degree the successes and failures of its economic development.  As such, 
ongoing shifts in the military landscape of the country have rendered any economic or 
infrastructural development progress highly vulnerable and subject to rapid deterioration.  
The economic and socio-political structures that have formed under this context of 
international intervention, nearly all of which are characterized by some significant degree of 
operational inefficacy or illegitimacy, pose additional challenges to the continued “success” 
of the state in the near future.  These obstacles, coupled with the uncertainty associated with 
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the ongoing withdrawal of Coalition military and infrastructural assets from the country, 
have prompted a sharp economic contraction in Afghanistan since 2013. 
Following the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 
2001, the United States accompanied by a narrow coalition of developed western states 
began a limited military offensive in Afghanistan.  This offensive, which officially began in 
October of that year, was carried out under the pretext of finding and neutralizing the Al 
Qaeda threat that had claimed responsibility for the 9/11 attacks, as well as to remove the 
ruling Taliban regime that openly harbored these terrorist groups (and notably Osama Bin 
Laden) from power (Carter 2011, 23).  This Taliban regime, officially ruling as the Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan, had “enjoyed the recognition of only three countries: UAE, Pakistan 
and Saudi Arabia” while in power, and is generally considered to have been one of the most 
socially regressive and illiberal states in modern history (Zaidi 2006, p. 23). 
 As Early as December 2001, western coalition forces, which had expanded 
significantly in only a few short months and was reorganized at the UN-sponsored Bonn 
Conference into a multilateral International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), had 
systematically and overwhelmingly routed Taliban combatants and state apparati from their 
stronghold in Kabul, Afghanistan (NATO ISAF, History).  Coalition ISAF military 
campaigns, which in 2003 were consolidated under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
with the leadership of the United States government, gradually escalated until late 2011 
following a series of troop redeployment ‘surges’ (NATO ISAF, Stage 4).  At its peak in 
March of 2011, NATO-ISAF forces consisted of approximately 132,203 western combatants, 
over 90,000 of which were American armed forces personnel (NATO ISAF Facts and 
Figures, p. 2).   
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After the death of Osama Bin Laden in northern Pakistan in May of 2011 and several 
key strategic military victories, western coalition forces began to undergo a gradual but 
comprehensive shift towards military de-escalation culminating in the 2012 NATO summit 
in Chicago, Illinois.  There, 46 countries ultimately resolved to carry out a multilateral 
military withdrawal from Afghanistan, after which primary military and police operations in 
the state would be handed completely over to Afghan National Army and Police personnel 
comprising the Afghan National Security Force, or ANSF (NATO Chicago, Article 1).  
Immediately following the dissolution of the International Security Assistance Force in 
January of 2015, NATO restructured its operations in the Afghanistan theater under the 
Resolute Support Mission (RSM) with 42 nations contributing a relatively small total of 
13,195 troops to assist and advise Afghan national military and police forces (NATO RSM, 
p. 2). 
This transition, while outwardly positive, does represent a series of critical problems 
for Afghanistan’s state security, and by extension its economy, in the immediate future.  
Despite optimistic growth levels of ANSF operational capacities, the organization continues 
to be undermined by crippling “desertion rates, retention problems, illiteracy rates, and rates 
of drug use”, as well as significant deficiencies in the areas of “command, control, and 
intelligence; air support, medical evacuation, logistics and maintenance; and contractor 
management, battle-space integration, and other specialty enablers” (Felbab-Brown 2013, p. 
25).  These operationally inhibitive factors, when combined with the increasingly pervasive 
degrees of Taliban resistance and “shadow control” over rural provinces, leave little real 
hope for significant levels of sustainable Afghan security under the ANSF relative to those 
achieved by coalition military forces (Felbab-Brown 2013, p. 25).   
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 The removal of the Taliban from rule in 2001 left an enormous power vacuum in the 
Afghan state; not only had western coalition forces driven the people in power out of the 
capitol, but subsequent military operations rendered Afghanistan’s previously negligible 
infrastructural capacity virtually nonexistent.  The first steps towards the reconstitution and 
rehabilitation of the Afghan state occurred in 2001 with the UN-orchestrated Bonn 
Conference, which established an interim Afghan authority led by Hamid Karzai that 
ultimately resulted in the drafting of the current constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, Karzai’s election as president in 2004, and Afghanistan’s first democratic 
national assembly elections in 2005 (CIA, Background). 
2.2 Afghanistan’s Political Legitimacy Crisis 
Initial optimism in the international community regarding the Karzai administration’s 
potential for liberal and legitimate political reform in Afghanistan eroded rapidly as early as 
2009, when it became increasingly clear that the state and its officials would continue to 
excuse rising levels of corruption in both public and private sectors (Felbab-Brown 2013, p. 
28).  Since its creation, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has consistently been ranked 
among the most corrupt states in the world, and as of 2013 tied with Somalia and North 
Korea as having the highest degree of state corruption internationally (TPI, Index).  These 
rising corruption trends stem from the state’s high levels of public sector bribing and 
patronage practices, both of which have steadily risen proportionally to the state’s GDP 
(UNODC, p. 5).  Similar corruption patters are facilitated in the private sector by the 
predominance of “hawala” informal money transfer systems, which are often used in place of 
formal banking institutions as a means to avoid the regulation and tracking of currency 
exchange (Buddenberg 2006, p. 155). 
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 These high corruption rates are directly connected to the ongoing legitimacy crisis 
faced by the Afghan government in Kabul centered around the presidential executive office.  
Rural populations, which constitute a majority of the Afghan populace, are both ethnically 
and linguistically highly heterogeneous (CIA, People and Society).  These schisms result in 
the profound disconnection and alienation of the Afghan people from their state, causing 
state political representation to be perceived by the public as a matter of “mafia-like power 
brokering” that does not extend beyond the capitol in Kabul (Felbab-Brown 2013, p. 29).  
These perceptions are perpetuated by the very real lack of infrastructural and administrative 
capacities of the state to provide needed social services in the first place.  Ultimately, this 
state-public rift, coupled with extremely limited Afghan governmental and political capacity 
as measured by the state’s low levels of extractive capability (referring to revenue 
collection), political accountability, and public transparency, make prospects for political 
stability and longevity difficult to impossible (Riphenburg 2006, p. 514).  This is evidenced 
by the confused outcome of the 2014 presidential election, in which widespread electoral 
fraud and polling issues rendered voter results unreliable and thus necessitating a “unity 
government” power sharing between the two candidates, incumbent Hamid Karzai and newly 
“elected” president Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai (Asian Development Outlook, p. 97). 
2.3 The Political Economy of Afghanistan 
 Afghanistan’s current economic situation is the product of over thirty years of armed 
conflict and governmental instability throughout the region.  Low levels of infrastructural 
support and high levels of fiscal criminality have worked in concert with one another to yield 
a volatile and illicit-industry dependent economic status-quo.  Contemporary Afghan gross 
domestic product (GDP) composition by sector of origin can roughly be divided as 24.6% 
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agricultural (excluding opiate production), 21.8% industrial (small-scale production of 
bricks, textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizer, apparel, food products, non-alcoholic 
beverages, mineral water, cement; handwoven carpets; natural gas, coal, copper), and 53.5% 
service based (CIA, Economy).  These figures, given the relatively high service sector 
output, would be promising if it were not for their stark contrast with the division of the 
Afghan labor force: approximately 78.6% of the population being agricultural, with only 
5.7% and 15.75% of the population being industrial and service-based respectively (CIA, 
Economy).  The significant contribution of the Afghan service sector to overall GDP presents 
a problem in and of itself, as it is difficult to calculate the degree to which it has been directly 
dependent on the heavy presence of foreign nationals in the state (a presence that continues 
to sharply decline following 2014 coalition withdrawals). 
 Another leading problem in the Afghan economy is the monumental degree to which 
it is dependent on the production and exportation of illicit opiate products.  Afghanistan is the 
largest producer and distributer of opiates in the world, with the size of its drug sector 
equaling approximately 62% of the state’s licit GDP in 2002/03 (Buddenburg 2006, p. 27).  
Though the contribution of the opium sector to the Afghan economy relative to licit industry 
and agriculture has declined significantly throughout the last decade, due in no small part to 
aggressive measures by organizations such as the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 
it remains an inextricable facet of the state’s monetary landscape.  Given the relative 
availability and economy of effort associated with narcotics production in rural provinces 
throughout Afghanistan, it is unlikely that the opiate industry can practically be replaced in 
the short term: 
Growers and traffickers’ income from opium production will continue 
massively to support domestic consumption of goods and services. While it has 
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serious negative consequences for political stability and the security situation, 
the drug economy lends crucial support to the formal economy. A sharp 
decrease in opium production could easily thrust Afghanistan into recession.  
(Riphenburg 2006, p. 515) 
 
This problem is perpetuated by Afghanistan’s current lack of any real alternative means of 
revenue production.  Licit exports in the state, which totaled a meager $466 million USD in 
2012, are largely confined to agricultural products such as fruits, cotton, and animal furs 
(Observatory of Economic Complexity, see appendix 1).   
Despite all of this, Afghanistan’s economy between 2001 and 2012 demonstrated an 
impressive degree of economic growth, during which time GDP has increased at an average 
rate of 9% annually, “though with wide year-to-year fluctuations largely caused by 
agriculture’s volatility” and the variable security of the state as a whole (Hogg 2013, p. 5).  
The consistent and undeniably positive economic trends in Afghanistan leading up to 2013, 
however, are far from indicative of the state’s capacity for antonymous economic growth, or 
even stability. Quite the opposite, Afghan contemporary economic development is better 
understood as a metric of international monetary aid than of actual state progress. 
2.4 International Development Operations in Afghanistan 
Since 2001, Afghanistan has been the recipient of enormous and steadily increasing 
amounts of development and reconstruction assistance aid from the international community.  
According to the World Bank’s analytical report entitled Afghanistan in Transition: Looking 
Beyond 2014, Afghanistan received approximately 15.7 billion USD in total monetary aid, a 
value roughly equivalent to the state’s highest recorded annual GDP throughout the last 
decade, during the 2010/11 fiscal year alone (Hogg 2013, p. 47).  Among the many 
contributing monetary lending and aid organizations, the World Bank, Asian Development 
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Bank, and the International Monetary Fund have arguably been the most significant with 
regard to the magnitude and impact of their contributions. 
The World Bank resumed operations in Afghanistan in May 2002, and has since 
“provided a total of over $3.07 billion for development and emergency reconstruction 
projects, and five budget support operations in Afghanistan…over $2.63 billion in grants and 
$436.4 million in no-interest loans” called credits (World Bank, Strategy).  The bulk of this 
aid has been directed at fulfilling the objectives outlined in the Bank’s “Interim Strategy 
Note” on Afghanistan, which focuses on the three strategic pillars of development: “building 
the legitimacy and capacity of institutions, equitable service delivery, and inclusive growth 
and jobs” (World Bank, Strategy).  Similarly, the Asian Development Bank continues to 
contribute heavily to Afghanistan’s economy, having provided “$952 million in sovereign 
and nonsovereign loans, along with $2.2 billion worth of grants” by the conclusion of the 
2013 fiscal year (ADB Fact Sheet, p. 1). 
The World Bank utilized various means and affiliated elements of its own 
organization to pursue these three strategic development principles.  The Bank’s 
“concessionary lending arm”, the International Development Association (IDA), is integrally 
involved in the Bank’s allocation of state financing in Afghanistan, and serves as the ultimate 
signing authority for all credits awarded within the scope of development operations (World 
Bank, The World Bank Group and Afghanistan).  The World Bank Group affiliated 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) complements international grants and credits in 
Afghanistan’s development  process through bolstering leading elements of the private sector 
in the state; to date the “IFC's investment portfolio spans five companies: First Microfinance 
Bank of Afghanistan ($2 million), Afghanistan International Bank (trade facility), telecos 
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MTN Afghanistan ($60 million) and Roshan ($65 million), and the Serena Kabul Hotel ($3 
million)” totaling some $131 million in foreign direct investment (IFC,  IFC in Afghanistan).  
The World Bank Group member agency Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
established in 2004 the Afghanistan Investment Guarantee Facility (AIGF) that facilitates the 
connection between potential foreign investors and domestic investment opportunities within 
Afghanistan (MIGA, p. 3).  Finally, the World Bank Group’s most significant source of 
direct funding in the state comes from the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, whose 34 
member states have committed $7.99 billion since its inception in 2002, generating grants for 
specific development projects within the state (World Bank, The World Bank Group and 
Afghanistan). 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reengaged itself with Afghan reconstruction 
in 2002 beginning with a limited surveillance and advisory presence in Kabul aimed at 
“providing technical assistance to develop monetary instruments, strengthen the central bank, 
modernize foreign exchange regulations, revamp tax and customs administration, enhance 
public financial management, and improve the national accounts, and price and balance of 
payments statistics” (IMF, p. 2).  IMF involvement in Afghan development eventually 
culminated in a pair of successive Extended Credit Facilities (ECF), a form of high 
concessionality loan program, between 2006-10 and 2011-14 respectively (IMF, p. 2).  Like 
the World Bank, IMF programs in Afghanistan target a number of general goals, namely 
“safeguarding the fragile financial sector…improving economic governance… [and] raising 
the government’s domestic revenue collection” (IMF, p. 2). 
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2.5 Consequences and Future Development Prospects 
All of the aforementioned factors, state-security issues, government operational and 
legitimacy issues, and illicit-industry driven economic sustainability issues, have a number of 
dire implications for real-world foreign aid effectiveness in Afghanistan, and on a larger 
scale the future of Afghanistan’s economy as a whole.  First, and perhaps most significantly, 
the fact that foreign aid disbursements, both civilian and military, have come to equal or 
exceed Afghan GDP is indicative that a vast majority of Afghan public spending is not 
financed by the state itself: 
Out of an estimated total public spending of 52 percent of gross domestic 
product, the IMF estimates that donors ﬁnanced 31 percent of GDP via extra-
budgetary operations in addition to providing 10 percent of GDP in grants 
directly to the Afghan budget. The remaining 11 percent of GDP of public 
spending came from domestic revenue collection. In other words, only one-
ﬁfth of Afghan public spending was funded from domestic means [since 2001].  
(Aslam 2013, p. 5) 
 
A recent study by the United States Congressional Research Service estimates that as of 2013 
“donor aid already accounts for more than 95% of Afghanistan’s GDP and at least two-thirds 
of total Afghan government expenditures” (Katzman 2015, p.53).  These inflows contribute 
themselves to GDP primarily via household consumption (amounting to 96.5% of GDP) and 
government spending and fixed capital investment (amounting to 23.3% and 25.4% of GDP 
respectfully), all of which are offset by state imports (amounting to -63.4% of GDP ) (CIA, 
Economy).   This places any significant future development progress in Afghanistan at the 
mercy of uninterrupted foreign aid, particularly in light of the state’s consistent and 
significant trade deficit (see appendix 2).   
Second, the negative consequences of the Afghan government’s projected inability to 
support its public spending are compounded by the low impact propensity of foreign aid 
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efforts.  This is the direct result of Afghanistan’s high levels of government corruption and 
funding misallocation
4.  The degree to which foreign aid money is essentially ‘wasted’ 
remains unclear; however, it is obvious that the success of aid-based development is only 
39guaranteed insofar as the basic infrastructure needed to relay that aid is in place (Zaidi 
2006, p. 35).  In Afghanistan this is clearly not the case.  The most prominent sources of 
monetary aid, such and the World Bank and IMF, have limited capacities either to enforce 
proper aid allocation to specific infrastructural projects or to prevent its misuse.  Rather, 
NATO (acting at times as a proxy for the US Agency for Internal Development) has been the 
most significant source of tangible infrastructural development, including the construction of 
roads, pipelines, electric power lines, etc. (Shroder 2007, p. 98-104).  This leading 
involvement by elements of the international military community in development efforts will 
be discussed at length later. 
Finally, the connections, both explicit and implicit, between the presence of western 
coalition forces (ISAF under NATO command) and economic growth in Afghanistan have 
had serious negative consequences over the past 18 months.  The 2014 withdrawal of 
coalition forces, given the general operational incapacities of the Afghan National Security 
Force, may render many of the county’s rural provinces beyond the effective control of the 
Afghan state, which in turn may handicap any practical means of carrying out capacity 
building projects beyond the state’s capitol in Kabul, let alone to Afghanistan’s most rural 
eastern and southern provinces.  At the very least, concerns over Afghanistan’s political and 
military instability have cripplingly reduced the willingness of international investors to 
involve themselves in the state, ultimately reducing foreign direct investment to less than $60 
                                                 
4
 A prime example of this would be the 2010 crisis surrounding the Kabul Bank, in which some $910 Million 
USD disappeared, prompting a domestic banking panic (Boone). 
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million USD in 2013, an insignificant figure in light of the state’s $20 billion USD GDP (see 
appendix 3).  Additionally, it will remove NATO as a significant source of skilled 
infrastructural-development-specific labor and monetary aid, a significant amount of which is 
allocated directly to extra-budgetary projects by prominent international organizations (Hogg 
2013, p. 2).   
Afghan economic success between 2001 and 2012 has been subject to significant 
“distortions created by Afghanistan’s high aid dependency and reliance on the international 
community” and will likely be further impacted by the ongoing “drawdown of international 
troops (with associated reductions in international military expenditures) and the anticipated 
decline in aid” overall in the wake of the 2014 fiscal year (Hogg 2013, p. 143).  This 
economic contraction is already observable, with Afghanistan’s annual GDP growth 
dropping from 14% in 2012 to as low as 2% in late 2013 (see appendix 4).  At present, there 
is relatively little state control of Afghanistan’s economic trajectory despite efforts by its 
central bank (as expressed in their very brief and nonspecific monetary policy) to limit 
inflation via slight manipulations to required reserve rates and encourage increased foreign 
investment (Da Afghanistan Bank, Monetary Policy).  Ultimately, the economic success or 
failure of the state in the coming decade will likely be determined by its ability to identify 
and exploit viable means of increasing its exports through either industrial production or 
resource extraction focused around regional mineral deposits, and through using these 
potential job sectors to improve domestic employment rates. 
2.6 The Role of Rural Infrastructural Projects in Afghan Development 
 Integral to this shift in the Afghan economy towards higher employment in licit, self 
sustaining, exportable industry and agriculture is the considerable attention paid by 
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international and domestic development agencies to the rehabilitation of the state’s rural 
provinces.
5
  This rural infrastructural development is vital for numerous reasons, both to the 
rural populaces it directly effects and to the economic recovery and development of 
Afghanistan overall.   
The important role of rural infrastructural development, and particularly of programs 
designed to improve rural access to the state’s principal infrastructure, is highlighted in the 
Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) adopted in 2008 by the Karzai regime, 
which describes “rural access roads as a key to raising rural livelihoods and reducing poverty 
and vulnerability in rural areas” through improving “market access and opportunities for 
rural households” (ANDS 2008, p. 9).   
The importance of rural access for development is similarly acknowledged by the 
International Development Association and International Finance Corporation (of the World 
Bank Group)  in the latter two of the three core principles of their financial year 2012-14 
Interim Strategy Note, which calls for “equitable service delivery” and “inclusive growth and 
jobs” (IDA 2012, p. ii).  Here, “equitable service delivery” is intended by the World Bank 
Group as a strategy to mitigate the historically problematic concentration of development 
efforts and funding within the same southern and eastern regions of the state, regions that are 
neither the most impoverished nor in the greatest need of aid to begin with (IDA 2012,  p. ii).  
Instead, a focused effort to improve access to northern and  northeastern provinces where aid 
                                                 
5
 A study conducted by the Asian Development Bank in 2006 enumerates some of the more significant effects 
of securing viable, year-round access to roads on rural development.  As one would expect, “The spatial 
position appears to have a significant bearing on development. Remoteness is an aspect of poverty, and where 
communities are far from existing marketing centers, the dynamism of development is lessened considerably. 
Impacts appear to be of a higher order in locations closer to major centers, or where the density of population 
and settlement is higher, than in areas that are much more remote” (Hettige 2006, p. 32).  Ultimately, “the study 
confirms that better rural roads are a necessary but not sufficient condition for graduating from poverty”, and 
should therefore be prioritized among development projects within a given operational theater as a necessary 
prerequisite for overall development success (Hettige 2006, p.32). 
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is most significantly lacking will allow for aid flows to reach the most critical populations in 
the state, while simultaneously mitigating any significant potentials for corrupt bureaucratic 
practices of inequitable aid distributions under the excuse of ‘poor access’ (IDA 2012, p. ii).   
Likewise, the focus on “inclusive growth and jobs” in the effort to elevate “the nearly 50 
percent of the population that is below or near the poverty line” is predicated on the 
transportation abilities of rural populations to interface with state markets (IDA 2012, p. ii).   
Like the World Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank places strategic priority on 
improving and securing rural access as a part of their greater development doctrine for 
Afghanistan.  The Asian Development Bank has fully aligned their own development 
strategy for the state, as expressed in their 2009-13 Country Partnership Strategy for 
Afghanistan, with the principals established in the Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy (ADB 2008, p. ii).  There, improvements to road infrastructure is the first of their 
target development outcomes, and improvements to transportation infrastructure is one of 
four of their priority sectors and themes for development (ADB 2008, p. ii-iii). 
The obvious strategic importance of rural access development as indicated by these 
institutions is well founded, particularly for a state such as Afghanistan, for a number of 
significant reasons.  First, and arguably most importantly, rural access capabilities for the 
state’s more remote populaces is a necessary prerequisite for access to social services such as 
medical care and education.  This need arises from decades of conflict and the resulting 
infrastructural neglect of healthcare and educational services for a majority of the state’s 
rural population.  Indeed, one of the principal obstacles to overcoming this healthcare crisis is 
the simple “lack of access owing to transportation difficulties or substandard referral 
systems” (Reilly et. al. 2004).  While a substantial portion of this problem is directly tied to 
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the lack of medical infrastructural spending in the state, as evidenced by the fact that “Health 
expenditure is 0.5% of the GDP and represents 6.1% of the current expenditure, for a public 
health expenditure of $1 per capita”, the problem is also significantly tied to a prerequisite 
lack of rural accessibility to what little infrastructure does exist in the state (WHO, 
Afghanistan: main public health issues and concerns).  Between 2002 and present day, the 
number of Afghans who lived within a one-hour walk of a medical facility increased from 
only 9 percent to 57 percent of the population, a change that is overwhelmingly positive but 
nowhere near acceptable relative to international standards for medical access (USAID 2015, 
Afghanistan: Health). 
In addition to serving as a necessary prerequisite to social service infrastructural 
development, rural access improvements also have the potential to significantly boost the 
state’s economic performance through improved agricultural industry and increased access to 
metal and mineral natural resources in the state’s rural provinces.  The increased 
commercialization of licit agriculture that improved road access facilitates could serve as an 
invaluable ‘carrot’ in incentivizing the population of Afghanistan to move away from illicit 
opiate production and trade towards more legitimate and sustainable crops that contribute 
directly to state GDP growth (Hettige 2006, p. 20).  Similarly, Afghanistan’s natural deposits 
of precious and semiprecious metals and minerals , with a 2010 geological survey estimated 
worth of approximately one trillion dollars, hold the exciting potential to produce significant 
state revenue through exports and remanufacturing (UNEP 2013, p. 37).  However, like state 
social infrastructure and agro-business improvements, Afghanistan’s extractive industry’s 
success notably relies on the presence of viable, state-wide access and its maintenance (see 
appendix 5). 
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Ultimately, rural access in Afghanistan represents on the single greatest strategic 
obstacles for the success of its overall development in the long run.  Improvements to access 
not only hold the promise of improvements to state and local economies, but also represent a 
necessary piece of the puzzle in guaranteeing the security of the state in the coming years, as 
western coalition forces continue to demobilize from the area; viable year-round access to all 
provinces in the state ensures that limited Afghan security resources can most efficiently 
access and mitigate security concerns as they arise.  In this way, rural access is a vital link in 
securing regional stability throughout Afghanistan by means of improving intrastate 
connectivity of security and trade. 
Rural access does, however, simultaneously represent of the most significant points 
of vulnerability to the success of Afghanistan’s development.  Inherent to the state context of 
ongoing conflict and instability, in addition to the remote nature of many of these projects, 
the implementation and completion of rural access development itself produces a number of 
structural and logistical challenges that must be met.  These structural and logistical 
challenges to development in Afghanistan are addressed in the following chapter. 
Ch 3: Afghanistan’s Rural Development Analyzed 
 Rural infrastructural development, and particularly rural access development, has 
proven vital to the overall rehabilitation of Afghanistan post-2001.  As discussed in the first 
chapter of this thesis, cooperative development efforts in the region are significantly 
challenged by the difficult operational environment Afghanistan provides; noteworthy levels 
of ongoing conflict, state corruption and illegitimacy issues, illicit substance trade 
dependence, and foreign aid dependence significantly threaten the successful recovery of the 
state from decades of conflict and detrimental government under Taliban rule.  Building on 
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the discussions held in the second chapter of this thesis, there are number of specific ways in 
which rural infrastructural development in Afghanistan has been challenged and proven 
ineffectual, many of which are epiphenomenal to the modern development structures at work 
in the state.   
One such structural issue is posed by inconsistencies in the reported development 
strategy of the World Bank Group for its operations in Afghanistan.  An Independent 
Evaluation Group (IEG) review or World Bank, International Finance Corporation, and 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency operations in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2011 
revealed that significant institutional inertial problems handicapped the Banks ability to 
effectively and appropriately adapt its functional development strategy after shifts  in the 
operational climate of the state in 2006 (IEG 2013, p. 16).  When the Bank resumed 
operations in the state in 2002, it conducted a series of preliminary needs assessments that 
yielded two Transitional Support Strategies (TSS’s) which focused development strategy “on 
building core state institutions, delivery of services to restore confidence in the state, 
rehabilitating critical infrastructure, and building the knowledge base for future development 
assistance. Priority was given to development of public financial management (PFM) 
systems with strong fiduciary controls; outreach to rural communities through a community 
development program (the National Solidarity Program) 16 Evaluation of World Bank 
Programs in Afghanistan, 2002-11 to promote a sense of inclusion among rural communities; 
rehabilitation of rural roads and irrigation systems to support rural development and short-
term employment; and restoring public health and education services” (IEG 2013,  p. 15-16).   
While the immense (and notably undefined) scope of this development strategy may 
have been an appropriate benchmark from which to begin development operations, the 
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enormous scale of the suggested development goals makes them impractical in their 
unattainability in the long run. 
6
  The Bank largely maintained  the overly-broad substantive 
design of this development strategy when its produced its first two Interim Strategy Notes for 
Afghan development, one in 2003 and another in 2006, reorganizing the strategy into the 
three strategic pillars of development discussed in section 2.4 of this thesis (IEG 2013, p. 16).  
In doing so, the Bank failed to properly account for the deteriorating security situation and 
increasingly prominent governmental legitimacy crisis by reducing the scope of their 
strategic development goals: 
In 2009, the Bank opted for another ISN, which continued with the same pillars 
and operations envisaged under the 2006 ISN. Although the 2009 ISN 
recognized growing governance and security challenges, it did not scale back 
the ambitious objectives laid out in the previous one. Both ISNs reflect a 
continuation of approaches initiated under the TSSs, with some small-scale 
initiatives to fill gaps, but without an overall road map of the foundations for 
future growth. (IEG 2013, p. 16) 
 
The resulting situation is one in which World Bank development strategy in Afghanistan 
continues to attempt to engage with a large spectrum of issues on an enormous operational 
scale, rather than on a scale that is appropriately adapted and controlled for the periodic 
deterioration we have observed in the state’s development climate since 2006.   One of the 
great ironies of this strategic over commitment by the World Bank is that they themselves are 
aware of the dangerous degree to which the magnitude of this aid is rendering the 
government and economy of Afghanistan dependent on international support for survival 
(IDA 2012, p. 4). 
                                                 
6
 The same criticism could be leveled at the United Nations Development Program “Millennium Development 
Goals” for a state such as Afghanistan; large and optimistic goals may be a useful launching point for a 
development project, but ultimately undermine the success of development efforts before they even begin 
insofar as the goals they establish are largely too optimistic to be attainable within any bounded and reasonable 
operational period (UNDP, MDG’s).   
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 Afghanistan’s operational context of conflict (already discussed at some length in 
sections 1.3 and 2.1 of this thesis) offers additional structural challenges to state 
development.  Most obviously, the distinct instability of many of the state’s provinces 
renders difficult and dangerous any and all development work on the ground for personnel 
(both domestic and international).  This places development institutions such as the World 
Bank at a distinct disadvantage in the state, both because they are doctrinally unaligned to 
operate in conflict conditions (Afghanistan only actually manifested “post-conflict” 
conditions of relative stability between 2002 and 2005 before the security situation began to 
deteriorate in 2006) and because unlike most “Fragile Conflict-Affected States” (FCS’s) the 
Taliban combatants of Afghanistan have historically prioritized the international 
development community as targets for attack (IEG 2013, p. 5).  The dangers and austerity of 
the operational conditions of Afghanistan are noted significantly in the International 
Evaluation Groups assessment of World Bank project portfolio risk in the state, with 
conditions deteriorating sharply in financial year 2007 and peaking in 2011 when “ 39 
percent of projects in Afghanistan were at risk compared with 20 percent for South Asia, 
while the percentage of commitments at risk is 26 percent for Afghanistan and 14 percent for 
South Asia, indicating that likely outcome ratings may decline” (IEG 2013, p. 19). 
 Interestingly, the prominent security risk posed to the international development 
community and its projects within Afghanistan has largely come to dictate the geographical 
focus of aid disbursements, and not where one would expect them.  Fascinatingly, 
international “Donor assistance has had little connection with poverty targeting, but rather 
has been directed towards areas where insurgency, and thus International Security Assistance 
Force and Provincial Reconstruction Teams‘ (PRTs) involvement, has been the greatest” 
48 
 
(IDA 2012, p. 10).  In this way, development aid throughout Afghanistan in general, and 
particularly in the most impoverished and isolated rural regions, has disproportionately 
flowed towards regions in which coalition military operations are most significantly present, 
thus neglecting other regions that may lack high levels of insurgent activity but are no lees in 
need of assistance.  As the Independent Evaluation Group observes, this recurring tendency 
on the part of key bilateral partners to Afghanistan’s development to bias their aid flows 
towards augmenting counterinsurgency operations is indicative of the distinct and 
problematic overlap between geopolitical, security, and development goals (IEG 2013, p. 5). 
Given these prevalent structural concerns, the remainder of this chapter will first 
examine four of the most prominent case studies of rural infrastructural development projects 
in Afghanistan: the National Emergency Employment Program, the National Emergency 
Employment Program for Rural Access Project, the National Emergency Rural Access 
Project, and the Afghanistan Rural Access Project.  Then, drawing on some of the most 
significant descriptive variables for rural infrastructural development projects established 
across this set of case studies, a brief analysis of prominent infrastructural international 
development projects in Afghanistan will be conducted on a broader subset of cases.  
3.1 Case Studies in Afghanistan’s Contemporary Development Projects 
 There are four significant projects sponsored by the World Bank that engage 
specifically with the poor rural access situation of post 2001 Afghanistan.  As the coming 
sections will demonstrate, these projects represent at once some of the most reportedly 
successful and some of the most risk-laden projects embarked upon by the Bank.  These 
projects illustrate both the significant challenges rural development projects face in the 
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Afghanistan theater as well as a variety of mitigation strategies that have been met with 
various degrees of success.   
It is important to note that the four World Bank Group projects chosen for analysis 
represent, in reality, a single iterative attempt by the Bank to address the infrastructural and 
policy issues surrounding the lack of rural access in Afghanistan.  Put differently, these 
projects are perhaps most accurately understood as a single, evolving development endeavor, 
and therefore could fairly be understood to share many of the same challenges and follow 
similar mitigation strategies simply by virtue of the fact that they are so connected.  
However, the World Bank chooses to document and assess the four projects in question as 
separate and distinct from one another.  Therefore, the following analysis will be conducted 
in much the same way: engaging with the pitfalls and shortcoming s, as well as the strengths, 
of each project independently. 
3.1.A - National Emergency Employment Program Phase I 
The World Bank Group National Emergency Employment Program (NEEP, later 
renamed the National Rural Access Program) was first approved on March 14, 2003 and 
continued until closing on March 31, 2009 (NEEP 2009, p. i).  The project, which was based 
on a multi-donor grant from the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund originally totaling 
$25.42 million USD across a number of components including roadway and irrigation 
infrastructural construction, was intended to “to assist the Recipient [the government of 
Afghanistan] in providing employment in rural areas at a minimum wage, as a safety net, to 
as many people and in as short a time as might be feasible” and constituted  the first 
concerted effort by the Bank to engage with and improve rural access in the state (NEEP 
2009, p. ii, 4).  This project was later built upon and supplemented with three other iterative 
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projects engaging with rural access development needs in the state (discussed in sections 
3.1.B, 3.1.C, and 3.1D of this thesis, see appendix 6).   
The project sought to accomplish this by establishing road sector and irrigation labor 
intensive public works that would simultaneously provide unskilled employment for as many 
Afghan nationals as possible, targeting in particular the most needy and vulnerable among 
them, while improving the rural infrastructure of the state as rapidly as possible (NEEP 2009, 
p. 4).  The project was largely instigated as a response to the nearly four fifths of the state’s 
population living in isolated rural regions on a subsistence basis with little opportunity for 
viable employment (NEEP 2009, p. 1).  The funding was disbursed directly to the 
government of Afghanistan and the project itself was implemented by the Afghan Ministries 
of Irrigation and Public Works, as well as the United Nations Office of Project Service 
(UNOPS), which served as the project’s Implementation Partner in a supervisory and 
assessment capacity (NEEP 2009, p. 7). 
The project itself featured a number of revisions throughout its six year operational 
period.  The first, and most considerable of these was the restructuring of the project’s goals 
away from socio-economic stimulus through mass employment towards a limited-scope 
focus on the provision of “durable rural access infrastructure” (NEEP 2009, p. 5).  This 
change (which was facilitated under the National Emergency Employment Project for Rural 
Access, or NEEPRA,  as a component of NEEP, further described in the following section of 
this thesis) was elicited by problems encountered early on with inconsistencies in the 
project’s targeted beneficiaries, or more specifically, with the social demographics the 
project initially targeted for employment.   
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The principal beneficiaries targeted by the project were rural households at large 
throughout each of the 34 provinces in which NEEP operated (NEEP 2009, p. 4).  Targeted 
beneficiaries unfortunately constitute the first notable point of failure for NEEP I, when soon 
after its initial implementation it “became clear that the labor-intensive nature of the works as 
well as prevailing social norms prevented the disabled and women from taking part in the 
works, except for activities such as weaving of gabion nets, which women could do within 
the confines of their family compound” (NEEP 2009, p. 6).  In this way, there was a distinct 
inconsistency within the project between targeting individuals who would be most capable of 
performing labor-intensive tasks and individuals who likely constitute the neediest elements 
of society with regard to employment.  These contradictions eventually prompted the project 
to turn away from rural community hiring towards more predictable contractor-based 
implementation. 
Several other risks and challenges are observable in the implementation of NEEP, 
even if only as a result of the fact that the program was, in many ways, the exploratory first 
run by the Bank at rural access development.  While the project is nominally rural in 
emphasis, a cursory examination of the World Bank’s published project implementation map 
reveals that a majority of the roadways built were ultimately focused around the provincial 
and state capitols of Afghanistan, and do not constitute a contiguous network of statewide 
roadways (IBRD 37438 Map, see appendix 7).  In that way, the project was, by design, 
severely limited in its ability to significantly and positively impact issues stemming from 
poor rural access on a national scale; its effects were largely isolated to the regions 
immediately surrounding the construction efforts.   
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Despite the relative concentration of project implementation sites around Afghan 
urban centers, the extended proximity from the state capital of many of these operational 
areas rendered the project extremely vulnerable to deteriorating security conditions.  This 
was especially true in the southern and eastern provinces of the state, where roadway 
construction subprojects were “severely hampered” by increasing insecurity during the latter 
half of NEEP’s operational period (NEEP 2009, p. 6).  In these situations, the project was 
forced to defer away from more skilled and capable contracting firms towards community-
based contracting methods in which local residents were awarded subcontracts (NEEP 2009, 
p. 6). 
The project faced a number of other, similar implementation challenges related to 
these contracting issues in rural regions.  The project failed initially to account for the poor 
capacity of contractors available for work in its areas of focus, and had difficulty disbursing 
adequate funding to those that were available (NEEP 2009, p. 7).  In order to mitigate these 
oversights, the project underwent two successive increases in funding for their access-based 
subprojects, once in 2005 and again in 2007, which increased the total funding available for 
roadway construction from $16.62 million USD to approximately $52.82 million USD 
(NEEP 2009, p. 5).  When formalized contracting became unavailable, as with the previously 
described situations of deteriorating security situations, community-based contracting offered 
its own, unique challenges to project implementation.  In particular, the project faced 
difficulties in competing for the consistent cooperation of local workforces with more 
lucrative employment opportunities in poppy sharecropping and opiates production; “it often 
happened that NEEP activities coincided with the peak poppy cultivation…causing 
attendance on NEEP subprojects to fall or become irregular” (NEEP 2009, p. 7). 
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Finally, the poor capacity of the implementing agencies, the Afghan Ministries of 
Irrigation and Public Works, necessitated early on the inclusion of the United Nations Office 
of Project Services as implementing partner (IP), a supervisory and regulatory entity.  This 
shortcoming was anticipated at the projects conception, as it was deemed “unlikely that the 
project could be delivered” in the absence of a heavily involved IP (NEEP 2009, p. 7).  
Despite this foresight, the project’s 2005 mid-term review still noted the implementing 
agencies “inability to monitor, evaluate and report on program implementation in a timely 
way” as significant adverse factors on project efficiency (NEEP 2009, p. 7). 
Because NEEP essentially represents the Bank’s “trial run” at rural access 
development in Afghanistan, many of the comprehensive mitigation strategies one would 
expect to the above-described project challenges and shortcomings failed to appear.  In 
reality, these strategies were ultimately relegated to later iterative rural access projects.  This 
more or less classifies NEEP as an expeditionary or “experimental” project used to establish 
a baseline for later reference, and demonstrates to a certain degree the Bank’s ability to adapt 
to changing country conditions (if a little slowly).  In spite of this, the Bank reports the 
general success of NEEP given its initial projects objectives and established indicators; for 
example, the Bank reports that upon completion NEEP achieved 102% and 101% of their 
initial targets for road construction (measured by kilometers completed or rehabilitated) and 
unskilled labor (measured as person-days) (NEEP 2009, p. 13).  However, it is worth noting 
that these values where achieved only after two substantial funding increases and that the 
“unskilled labor” values were likely significantly bolstered by the performance of “unskilled” 
tasks by professional contracting firms.
7
 
                                                 
7
 In Afghanistan “level-1” labor contracts, which encompass most unskilled labor, do not require formal 
enterprises or bidding and are not regulated explicitly by the government (NEEP ICRR 2009, p.6).  However, 
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Furthermore, an ex-post assessment of NEEP included in the Independent Evaluation 
Group’s report on World Bank operations in Afghanistan reveals that throughout the initial 
phases of the project there was no official coordination between the Bank and the domestic 
implementing agencies “on policy issues for rural roads, such as their appropriate width and 
surfacing, which are major concerns for a country with considerable geographic variation and 
severe winter conditions” (IEG 2013, p. 63).   
3.1.B - National Emergency Employment Program for Rural Access Project  
 The World Bank Group National Emergency Employment Program for Rural Access 
Project (NEEPRA) was first approved on 06/24/2003 and continued until closing on 
09/30/2007 (NEEPRA 2008, p. i).  The project, which was funded via a credit through the 
International Development Association and a multi-donor grant through the Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Trust Fun, constituted the second iterative component of the National 
Emergency Employment Program (discussed at length in the preceding section of this thesis) 
(NEEPRA 2008, p. 30).  NEEPRA was intended to improve “livelihoods of the rural poor in 
Afghanistan through: (i) the provision of emergency short-term employment opportunities 
for the poor on labor-based rural access infrastructure improvement subprojects; and, (ii) 
technical assistance for the implementation of NEEP” (NEEPRA 2008, p. iii). 
 NEEPRA is significant in that it became the primary operational component of NEEP 
following the 2004 World Bank and Afghan Government joint mid-term project review, 
which concluded that NEEP should be refocused away from “employment creation to 
provision of durable rural access infrastructure” following a series of setbacks in effectively 
targeting critical demographics of the state’s rural population for employment on a needs-
                                                                                                                                                       
level-1 contracts can be awarded to formal contracting enterprises in addition to community groups.  This 
makes it difficult to determine how much “unskilled labor”, measured in person-days, is actually affording rural 
populations employment opportunities versus how much is being handled by contracting enterprises. 
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basis (NEEPRA 2008, p. v).  Effectively, the program was unable to reliably offer 
employment to women, disabled, or certain tribal groups as a result of constraints stemming 
from prevalent cultural norms and customs in Afghanistan.   This shift in operational focus 
away from job creation to road construction through NEEPRA and the derivative challenges 
NEEP faced, discussed at some length in the previous section of this thesis, constitutes a 
major shift by the Bank away from social engagement development policy towards more 
aggressive efforts to erect physical assets of state infrastructure.  This policy shift, while 
understandable for operational reasons, is problematic in its increased detachment from the 
local populace who are ultimately affected by the outcomes of these projects. 
 Like NEEP, NEEPRA was implemented by Afghan governmental institutions with 
supplementary oversight by elements of the international development community.  
Specifically, NEEPRA was executed through Afghanistan’s Ministries of Public Works and 
Rural Rehabilitation and Development, with the United Nations Office of Project Services 
(UNOPS) acting as implementing partner (IP) and the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) providing additional technical assistance (NEEPRA 2008, p.6).  As with NEEP, 
NEEPRA’s success was largely contingent on the heavy handed guidance and, towards the 
latter half of the project’s term, the open project leadership of the IP as a result of the 
extremely limited capacities of Afghan government agencies at the time (NEEPRA 2008, p. 
6).   
While UNOPS as IP and the ILO as additional project facilitator were originally 
limited to providing focused technical assistance on the project’s cash-for-works operations, 
with the secondary directive of working to improve the capacities of the implementing 
domestic agencies, they ultimately ended up co-opting much of the projects public works 
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operations out of necessity in order to stay within established term and budgetary constraints 
(NEEPRA 2008, p. 6).  Even still, operational setbacks dictated the unplanned increase in 
NEEPRA’s operational term, with the originally scheduled closing date of 09/2006 delayed 
by one full year (NEEPRA 2008, p. i).  By the time of NEEPRA’s actual closing, it was 
determined that future iterations of Bank-sponsored rural access projects need to limit 
domestic bureaucratic capacity building efforts to staff directly involved with project 
implementation, rather than targeting implementing ministries at large because of the extent 
and severity of their capacity limitations (NEEPRA 2008, p. 19).   
 Because NEEPRA was implemented concurrently with the somewhat broader 
operations of NEEP, and because both projects operated in the same austere rural 
environments, there is a notable amount of overlap between the two with regard to the 
challenges faced throughout their durations.  As many of these issues have already been 
addressed in the previous section of this thesis, it is only worth highlighting a few issues that 
were either specific to NEEPRA or that manifested themselves in particularly significant 
ways.  First and foremost, the project faced unanticipated and highly inhibiting security risks 
throughout its duration, and particularly throughout the 2006-2007 period when statewide 
stability began to deteriorate especially in the isolated southern and eastern provinces, during 
which time project staff became “casualties or faced threats and warnings” and “criminal 
activities against staff, contractors, and offices increased” (see appendix 8) (NEEPRA 2008, 
p. 16).  These effects were particularly pronounced for NEEPRA, relative to NEEP, because 
of the narrow mandate of the project; road construction in specific, pre-designated locations 
likely allowed for far less security situational-dependent adjustments to project operations 
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than the broader mandate of NEEP.  This, coupled with the relatively low pre-surge coalition 
troop deployments at the time, made mitigating operational risk extremely difficult. 
Due in part to this high level of security risk, and as an artifice of the post-conflict 
development situation itself, the project faced high turnover and low rates of return for 
Afghan Ministry officials, fiduciary specialists, contractors, and qualified engineers 
(NEEPRA 2008, p. 16).  This rapid turnover of project staff within the Afghan implementing 
agencies and in the World Bank and implementing partner necessitated the simplification of 
the project’s operational scope, which originally sought build not only tertiary roads, but also 
secondary roads and bridge structures which require a significantly greater degree of 
expertise for successful and durable construction (NEEPRA 2008, p. 16).  This may have 
been because, at the time of NEEPRA’s completion, there was still no cooperatively 
designed or officially agreed upon “rural access development strategy” between the World 
Bank and the government of Afghanistan (IEG 2013, p. 63).  As discussed in the previous 
section, this lack of an overarching or universal rural access doctrine rendered project quality 
control and standardization difficult to impossible to enforce.  This brings up serious 
questions regarding the actual efficacy of this project in light of its stated objectives to 
“promote rural growth and reduce rural poverty primarily through the provision of local 
access infrastructure” (NEEPRA 2008, p. 7).  Even if target indicators for road constructions 
(kilometers completed) were met, to what degree was the current or future quality of these 
works going to undermine their functionality? 
It is not even clear that the self-reported accomplishment of the project‘s target 
indicators is a fair representation of its actual “success”.  In fact, it is likely that an apparent 
revision of these indicators following the 2004 project mid-term review gave both NEEP and 
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NEEPRA an inflated appearance of success.  Implementation Completion and Results 
Reports  for both projects claim 100% or greater achievement rates for road construction or 
rehabilitation (by kilometer completed), while an Independent Evaluation Group review 
determined that only 4,670 km of their originally planned combined target of 6,500 km was 
completed at the time of project closing (IEG 2013, p. 63).   Furthermore, the aforementioned 
security risks, staff turnover, and domestic capacity limitations present the serious risk that 
those roads that were successfully rehabilitated may not receive vital post-project term work, 
such as “routine and exceptional maintenance” (NEEPRA 2008, p. 16).    
3.1.C - National Emergency Rural Access Project  
 The World Bank Group National Emergency Rural Access Project (NERAP) was 
first approved on 12/13/2007 and continued operations until closing on 12/31/2013 (NERAP 
2014, p. i).  NERAP, which immediately follows NEEP I and NEEPRA in the Bank’s 
engagement with rural access development in Afghanistan, is unique among these case 
studies in that it represented at its outset the first real opportunity for the Bank to apply 
changes to its rural access doctrines learned from previously encountered operational 
challenges.   
The project’s overarching development objective, which departed from the policy 
templates established by NEEP I and NEEPRA, was “to provide year-round access to basic 
services and facilities in rural areas of Afghanistan…through rehabilitation and maintenance 
of rural access infrastructure by contracting with the private sector and, to a lesser extent, 
with the communities” (NERAP 2014, p. ii).  The most significant difference for NERAP’s 
stated goals from those of its predecessors’ is the explicit focus on the provision of “year-
round” roadways, which hold the potential for drastically improving regional licit trade at the 
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cost of increased construction quality controls and expense.  Another major revision of the 
project components from previous plans under NEEP and NEEPA was the inclusion of 
prescribed post-closing roadway maintenance mechanisms and capacity building for a 
domestic rural roads management body with delineated funding, in addition to the provision 
and rehabilitation of secondary and tertiary roads (NERAP 2014, p. 3). NERAP, like its 
predecessors, fell under the umbrella of the National Rural Access Program (formerly 
NEEP), and is closely tied to the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) for 
the 2008-13 period that was cooperatively developed by the World Bank and the Afghan 
government (NERAP 2014, p. 1).   
As with the previous projects, the implementing agencies of NERAP were the Afghan 
Ministry of Public Works (MPW) and Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development 
(MRRD), with the United Nations Office of Project Services acting as implementing partner 
(NERAP 2014, p. i). However, unlike previous attempts by the Bank to involve domestic 
agencies in project implementation, all of which resulted in some degree of failure due to the 
poor institutional capacities of these agencies necessitating the heavy-handed leadership of 
UNOPS, both the MPW and the MRRD demonstrated considerable improvements to their 
capacity and commitment in project operations throughout NERAP.  These improvements, 
which can fairly be attributed to the recurring inclusion of a capacity building component to 
NERAP and its predecessors, were significant enough to illicit the “transfer of responsibility 
from UNOPS to each ministry for contract management, retaining UNOPS only as a 
consultant/advisor” following the project’s 2010 mid-term review (NERAP 2014, p. 11).   
NERAP further distinguished itself from its predecessors by significantly revising its 
listed target indicators (NERAP 2014, p. iii-iv). Previous projects, specifically NEEPRA, had 
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focused its project performance indicators on “outputs” measurements such as kilometers of 
roadways completed or dollar amounts of funding disbursed because they are “simple to 
carry out and provide useful feedback about progress during implementation” (NERAP 2014, 
p. 5).  These output measurements, however, do not necessarily correlate directly to the 
social changes the project in question is trying to enact.  As such, NERAP supplemented its 
outputs measurements with a series of “outcome” measurements, which attempt to observe 
change in target social issues as a result of implemented development policy.  Some of these 
new indicators included: 
 (a) Travel time of beneficiaries living along the improved road to the first 
available schools, health care facilities and administrative services would be 
reduced by 30%. (b) The number of trips taken by beneficiaries living along the 
improved road to district centers would increase by 30%. (c) Prices of key 
consumption and production commodities at beneficiary villages would be 
within 15% of the price in the nearest town.”  (NERAP 2014, p. 2) 
 
By regularly measuring for these social variables, the project was notionally better able to 
monitor its tangible impact on rural society, with the ultimate goal being the rehabilitation of 
licit regional trade throughout the state.  The difficulty of conducting such observational 
studies is that, relative to their “outputs” counterparts, it is often considerably more 
challenging to determine a relevant unit of measure for any given target “outcome”.  One of 
the outcomes that the Bank was most concerned with, “monitoring the impact that the 
completion of project interventions had on agricultural diversity in areas where opium poppy 
was grown”, was difficult to measure for this very reason (NERAP 2014, p. 2).   
As a component part of greater development strategy, one of the explicit focuses of 
NERAP was on “reducing the incentives for villager to grow poppies” through “connecting 
rural communities to the nearest towns and markets, improving farmers’ access and enabling 
them to get better prices for their produce while lowering the cost of consumption essentials 
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as well as farm inputs” (NERAP 2014, p. 2).  This strategic emphasis of NERAP was elicited 
by the World Bank’s determination that a lack of access in rural regions serves as a primary 
reason for the impeded transition of rural economies from opiate production to licit 
agricultural and livestock growth (NERAP 2014, p. 2).  Similarly, NERAP placed a 
secondary emphasis on improving rural community access to “doctors and medical facilities 
in the provincial towns” as a potentially major galvanizing force in improving rural 
economies (NERAP 2014, p. 2).  These strategic imperatives, however, also presented 
serious security-related challenges to the project’s success, as many of the regions in which 
opiate production and healthcare issues propagate are also the most dangerous in 
Afghanistan; “districts in which opium poppy had been widely grown, such as Balkh, 
Badakhshan and Nangarhar, were identified to receive assistance; accordingly, 20-25% of 
Project roads were in high-security-risk areas” (NERAP 2014, p. 3). 
Another significant point of departure for NERAP from past operations was its 
emphasis on working cooperatively with the Community Development Councils (CDC’s) 
established under the National Solidarity Program (NSP) to integrate rural populations into 
regional and statewide markets (NERAP 2014, p. 1).  These councils were established to 
increase the involvement of local-level leadership in development projects taking place near 
their communities.  In the absence of CDC’s, NERAP facilitated the involvement of the 
Shura of village elders for a given community in subprojects that directly affected the 
surrounding area (NERAP 2014, p. 10).  In this way, NERAP made previously 
unprecedented efforts to involve extra-governmental Afghan nationals in the implementation 
process. 
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The reengagement on the part of the NERAP with rural Afghan social issues through 
the increased role of domestic Afghan institutions in project implementation and the 
inclusion of “outcomes” based performance indicators represents one of the most promising 
shifts to date in the rural development of Afghanistan.  Each of these initiatives possessed the 
potential to elevate the standard for acceptable development project outcomes, while 
simultaneously granting agency, responsibility and capacity to Afghan social and 
governmental institutions.  Unfortunately, upon implementation each of these strategies 
introduced new operational challenges to NERAP such that, in the eyes of the World Bank, 
their relative costs outweighed their benefits.  Unsurprisingly, these setbacks occurred 
concurrently with a number of other challenges to project success (much like with NEEP and 
NEEPRA). 
While the inclusion and focus on outcomes-based performance indicators had the 
potential to improve NERAP’s impact propensity on key rural social issues in the state, they 
“proved to be far more demanding to plan, carry out and interpret than the more basic output 
measures, and ultimately delivered ambivalent conclusions…in short, it was inappropriate for 
an emergency project in an insecure environment” (NERAP 2014, p. 5).  The implied 
recommendation by the World Bank at the conclusion of NERAP was the movement of 
future rural access projects away from outcomes-based indicators.  Ironically, these 
determinations were likely made, in part, because it was felt that outcomes-based indicators 
obscured the measurement of project success because they had proven more difficult to 
achieve.  While it may be true that outcomes are more difficult to secure than outputs, this is 
more accurately a reflection of the inadequacy of outputs as correlates of “real” project 
success as opposed to outcomes. 
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Despite general improvements to Afghan Ministry of Public Works and Ministry of 
Rural Rehabilitation and Development capacity and participatory effectiveness, NERAP was 
adversely impacted by corruption and poor transparency issues from within both agencies in 
the form of  “ poor compliance with fiduciary management norms on account of inadequate 
internal controls, mainly pertaining to MRRD [and] Poor safeguard management on account 
of mainly inadequate staffing in the MPW” (NERAP 2014, p. 6).This was likely due in part 
to the solidifying entrenchment of these institutions and the increasing tenure of domestic 
bureaucratic and governmental officials (NERAP 2014, p. 14).    
Like NEEP and NEEPRA, NERAP suffered from a lack of a standardized rural 
access development operating procedure agreed upon by both the World Bank and the 
government of Afghanistan: “no specific design standard was adopted for basic access roads 
until late 2011” (NERAP 2014, p. 6).  However, unlike NEEP and NEEPRA which suffered 
from inconsistent and often poor roadway construction quality, NERAP exhibited a 
propensity to overdesign and impose unnecessarily high quality standards on roads and 
bridges in an attempt to ensure their “year-round” usability which, while outwardly positive, 
imposed significant and unnecessary cost increases and implementation delays (NERAP 
2014, p. 6). 
Compounding these inflated delays and expenditures was the ever-deteriorating 
security situation in the first half of the project term, which led to further “increases in 
contract prices and time overruns” while making it more difficult “for Ministry and Bank 
staff to visit project sites regularly to make sure that works were being completed as planned 
and to the prescribed standards (NERAP 2014, p. 6).  While the latter of these two problems 
was effectively mitigated through the contracting of third parts quality-control consultants, 
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the resulting delays from the aforementioned factors were significant enough to elicit 
changes to NERAP itself.  Slower than expected implementation and cost overruns led the 
Bank at its December 2012 project mid-term review, which was itself delayed by almost a 
full year, to extend the operational term from its original closing date 12/31/2010 to 
12/31/2013 and seek an additional $91.65 million USD of funding from the International 
Development Association and Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, in doing so 
“enlarging the physical targets by about 25%” (NERAP 2014, p. 4).     
3.1.D - Afghanistan Rural Access Project 
 Unlike the three projects discussed previously, all of which are closed and 
their immediate outcomes largely determined, the Afghanistan Rural Access Project (ARAP) 
is still active and represents the most recent engagement by the World Bank Group with 
ongoing rural access policy and infrastructural issues.  The project was first approved on 
6/26/2012, and like its precursors is constituted by a multi-donor grant issued through the 
International Development Association and the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund 
(ARAP ISR 2012, p. 1).  As before, the implementing agencies for the project are the Afghan 
Ministries of Public Works and Rural Rehabilitation and Recovery.   
Because the project is still ongoing at the time of writing, there is little publicly 
disclosed information on any challenges it is facing and the associated mitigation strategies 
being employed beyond the Bank’s own initial speculations.  However, subtle changes to the 
project’s operational goals, components, and indicators in the wording of its currently 
published policy documents do reveal some interesting adjustments to Bank development 
doctrine relative to past projects.  No doubt, these alterations to project operations have been 
made in response to lessons learned during and before NERAP. 
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Building on the progress to domestic institutional involvement in rural access 
development operations established during NERAP, ARAP’s subproject financial 
management functions have gradually been transitioned to the MRRD and MPW finance 
departments, with the United Nations Office of Project Services on hire only in an 
implementation consultant role (ARAP ISR 2013, p. 1).  This operational leadership by the 
MRRD and MPW is somewhat surprising given the ongoing organizational oversight and 
corruption issues plaguing both organizations throughout the duration of NERAP.  However, 
it is was a wholly reasonable decision on the part of the World Bank to continue to heavily 
involve domestic institutions in project implementation, regardless of the associated 
“growing pains” and operational inefficiencies, as the successful future of Afghan-led rural 
rehabilitation ultimately hinges on these agencies’ gradual capacity cultivation. 
 The project’s stated development objectives are interesting in that they are somewhat 
more general and ambiguous than in the Bank’s previous rural access project iterations, 
stating “the project development objective is to enable rural communities to benefit from all-
season road access to basic services and facilities” (ARAP EPP 2012, p. 4).  While this 
overarching project objective is a definite continuation of the development themes put into 
place during NERAP, specifically with regard to the focus on the prevision of all-season 
roads, the three project components chosen to realize this objective are markedly different 
than previous Bank-sponsored rural access programs with regard to their operational focus 
and the sheer magnitude of the funding to be disbursed.  Under ARAP, the Bank has 
committed $186 million USD to “the improvement and [periodic] maintenance of secondary 
roads” including bridge structures, $128 million USD to “the improvement and [regular] 
maintenance of tertiary roads”, and $18 million USD to “program planning and development, 
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institutional strengthening and programming, and coordination and support” (ARAP ISR 
2014, p. 1). 
 The significant departure here of ARAP from past projects lies in the complete 
absence of the planned provision of any new roadways (excluding some bridge structures), 
and an alternative focus on the enhancement of standing rural access infrastructure and the 
domestic institutions responsible for its maintenance in the long run.  While it is quite 
possible that the Bank did not determine that any new roadways would provide significant 
enough social benefits to justify their costs, it is far more likely that this change in ARAP’s 
components reflects the Bank’s acknowledgement of the significant issues faced throughout 
past projects in the cost-effective quality standardization of new roadway construction and in 
ensuring the acceptable base-level capacities of domestic institutions to autonomously 
implement construction and maintenance policy in the future.  Rather than simply absorbing 
the risks and increased costs of these historical challenges to rural access development by 
attempting to build more roadways, as they did throughout NEEP, NEEPRA, and NERAP, 
the Bank has elected to face these issues head on in an attempt to definitively address them.  
This policy progress, perhaps above all others, positively demonstrates the Bank’s capacity 
for self-assessment and willingness to learn from past mistakes.  
Also surprising is the Bank’s decision to continue utilizing “outcomes” based 
progress indicators in addition to simpler “outputs” measurements for ARAP, albeit in a 
slightly different manner than during NERAP.  While ARAP continues to measure baseline 
“intermediate results indicators” (outputs) such as kilometers of secondary and tertiary 
roadways rehabilitated, they have also included a series of four “project development 
objective indicators” (outcomes) that will attempt to measure ARAP impacts on the 
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percentage of rural populations with access to all-season roadways, the total number of 
people with roadways access, the percent reduction in travel time by 4-wheel drive vehicles 
on rehabilitated roadways, and percentage increases in rural populations’ frequency of trips 
to the nearest essential services such as town markets, schools, and medical facilities (ARAP 
ISR 2012, p. 2-3).  This too represents a positive change in World Bank rural access 
development policy, especially in light of the internal criticism leveled against the use of 
“outcomes” based indicators such as these during NERAP, because of the increased project 
accountability to tangible societal improvement it implies. 
Unfortunately, not all aspects of ARAP demonstrate so encouraging a degree of 
learning-based improvement upon previous Bank projects.  Notably, the explicitly reported 
“lessons learned” that ARAP policy papers delineate do not differ in any way from those 
listed on either NERAP or NEEPRA (ARAP EPP 2012, p. 14).  While it would be 
presumptuous to read too far into this apparent omission of vital project history, it does seem 
to be a teachable moment for future rural access projects in Afghanistan when considering 
the monumental cost and consequence born by the Bank and other groups for past mistakes 
and oversights. 
While at the time of writing it remains too early to definitely grasp the full spectrum 
of challenges that ARAP will undoubtedly face throughout its operational term, several 
(relatively) minimal challenges have already been documented by the Bank.  The 2014 
presidential election and the associated uncertainty surrounding the new government that 
followed it did elicit a brief pause in project planning and implementation, though to severity 
and the duration of the delay is uncertain (and, in all likelihood, was relatively minimal) 
(ARAP ISR 2014, p. 2).  It seems as though ARAP has to this point managed to avoid many 
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of the delays its predecessors were subject to as a result of deteriorating security situations, 
though this may be more a product of the fact that the Bank is only revisiting old operational 
sites instead of venturing out into new and uncertain locations on the Afghan frontier than a 
product of any concerted mitigation efforts by the Bank itself.  Still, ARAP has already been 
forced to submit “two requests for additional resources” from “the WB office in March 2014 
from the Ministry of Finance to cover the cost overrun of the secondary roads and scale up 
the good performing components of the project”, though this was largely in response to a 
series of flood disasters that adversely and unexpectedly impacted project performance as 
opposed to operational inefficiency on the Bank or the implementing agencies’ parts (ARAP 
ISR 2015, p. 2). 
It will be fascinating to continue to observe ARAP for further developments in the 
coming years, as the project is currently scheduled to continue through 3/31/2018 (ARAP 
ISR 2015, p. 2).  More information pertaining to operational challenges and their 
corresponding mitigation responses from the Bank will likely become available following the 
July 2015 mid-term project review. 
3.2 Constructing a Simple Afghan Development Dataset 
 The major operational challenges and setbacks faced by each of these four case 
studies are not only significant in that they have critically inhibited the attainment of stated 
program goals and recurred in each iterative rural access project attempt, but also because 
they can be observed on a near-systemic basis throughout contemporary international efforts 
at infrastructural development in Afghanistan.  The greater picture being painted here is that 
rural access infrastructure is both a vital component of successful economic development 
statewide, and serves as an analog for the condition of general infrastructural development in 
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the state; problems encountered in one are likely to be reflected in the other. The noteworthy 
prevalence of these operational challenges across this broad spectrum of projects is a clear 
symptom of greater structural issues to current international development paradigms 
themselves, as discussed in section 1.2. 
 In order to demonstrate the systemic nature of these issues, this section will present a 
simple statistical analysis of post-2001 infrastructural development projects conducted by the 
World Bank in Afghanistan. The data included in this analysis was drawn from the Bank’s 
complete list of development projects and funding disbursements during this time frame with 
a few qualifiers: only those projects that targeted the provision of tangible state and 
community infrastructure (rather than general economic stimulus or “development funding”) 
were included.  The resulting list of 24 projects was then categorically organized by target 
sector of development (rural access, education, medical, agricultural, etc), as well as the 
projects’ regional emphasis (rural, urban, and statewide).  This categorization was derived 
from the principal project documents associated with each case, namely Implementation 
Completion and Results Reports (the list of included projects and their associated reports can 
be found in appendix 9).  It is worth noting that this dataset is subject to potential selection 
bias as only World Bank Group projects were included, and furthermore that all information 
on these projects was reported by the Bank itself.  This condition, while less than ideal, is 
necessary as little to no information regarding these projects is available from third party 
sources. 
 The most significant and recurring operational phenomena observable in the section 
3.1 case studies were translated into simple binary variables (coded as conditions present or 
not present) and then applied to this broader World Bank infrastructural development project 
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dataset.  The results are formulated to display the percent of the case studies in each category 
(rural, urban, or statewide) in which a variable is observable.  The findings of this analysis 
are represented in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Major challenges faced by World Bank infrastructural development projects 
in Afghanistan post-2001. 
 
 As with the qualitative assessment of the case studies presented in section 3.1, this 
data analysis reveals much about the problems observable in contemporary international 
development efforts in Afghanistan.  At face value, it is clear that nearly all of the above 
variables are significantly observable across all three project categories.  
 Limited domestic implementing agency capacity presents itself here as an 
overwhelmingly significant impediment to project efficiency, with 83.33% of all 
infrastructural development projects reporting the issue as significant (and relatively 
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comparable rural and urban values of 75% and 81.81% respectively).  While it is no 
particular surprise that Afghanistan’s bureaucratic capacity is lacking, these values are 
peculiar when considering the relatively high rates of positive evaluation by the World Bank 
of domestic implementing agencies, and particularly so for rural projects.  This is indicative, 
first and foremost, or serious issues within the Bank’s project evaluation protocols, a 
condition that we will see is recurring among many of these variables analyzed here.  As with 
the section 3.1 case studies, these widespread domestic institutional capacity issues are 
accompanied by the heavy-handed project management of the Bank and its Implementing 
Partners.  This is problematic not only because it handicaps the maturation and capacity 
building of these domestic institutions, but also because it distances them from the decision 
making processes that occur ex-ante and throughout these projects’ life spans. 
 Also unsurprising here is the statistical significance of regional conflict and 
“deteriorating security conditions” as an inhibiting factor to project efficiency and success.  
A full 100% of rural infrastructural projects and 83.33% of projects overall reported conflict 
and security challenges as one of the principal issues hampering their progress.  This nearly 
universal interjection of this variable against project success is not merely an artifice of the 
austere “post-conflict” nature of Afghanistan’s operational theater, but instead represents the 
ever increasing amalgamation of security and development issues.  The reason this effect is 
problematic is not simply because conflict zones present unique operational difficulties to 
effecting positive socio-economic change, but because the conceptual paradigms that serve as 
the foundation of each undermine the other (see section 1.3).   
Also troubling is the very low rate of explicit admission within the project 
Implementation Completion and Results Reports that coalition military or paramilitary 
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organizations, such as the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, were actually involved in 
project operationalization.  In fact, only three of the 24 cases included in the dataset made 
any mention of military assistance or involvement at all.  This is certainly not because the 
remaining projects forwent military assistance or partnership, as nearly all projects were 
forced at some point to confront conflict-related setbacks with security-increase 
countermeasures.
8
  Instead, the scarcity of this data is indicative of the general 
underreporting by development aid institutions of overt military involvement, leaving any 
connection between the two implicit rather than explicit in nature.  The hazard here lies in the 
fact that a lack of information, particularly when the information in question pertains to the 
volatile partnership of two nearly antithetical operational doctrines, translates to a great 
increase difficulty when attempting to measure the effects one process has on another.  If the 
consequences of this doctrinal incorporation are difficult to measure, so too is it difficult to 
hold the responsible institutions accountable. 
Other project-inhibiting factors, such as social and cultural resistance to project goals 
(such as labor diversion to poppy sharecropping), institutional role ambiguity, project 
standardization issues, and contracting issues were less prevalent, though still present, across 
the data set.  These issues may have had less significant and universal impacts on project 
completion because of variance in project type; cultural resistance to project goals, for 
example, is less likely to occur in sectors that immediately appeal to large portions of the 
population (such as improvements to irrigation infrastructure) than sectors that divert from 
existing cultural norms and economic practice (such as the diversion of farmers away from 
                                                 
8
 Section 1.3 further elaborates on this development-military involvement through a third party investigation of 
the Provincial Reconstruction Teams by Colin Jackson. 
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poppy sharecropping to licit agriculture following the provision of inter-provincial 
roadways). 
As a result of these various implementation-inhibiting factors, more than half of all 
projects included in the study required significant and unplanned increases to both their 
operational term and allocated funding.  Significantly, 87.5% of all rural infrastructural 
projects required at least one funding increase, and the mean ratio of these funding 
augmentations to overall funding disbursements was 35.52%.  Put differently, this means that 
over a third of the money spent on the completion of these rural projects consisted of 
unplanned, emergency spending increases, rendering the overall rural rehabilitation of 
Afghanistan grossly over budget.  This is, of course, indicative of either the nearly universal 
underestimation of these projects’ costs and difficulty or of the significant over-committing 
of the World Bank to unrealistic development goals.  In either case, these figures serve as 
evidence of a fundamental lack of understanding on the part of the development aid 
institution with regard to the situation on the ground and the most effective ways to go about 
practically improving upon it.  Additionally, as we saw in the section 3.1 case studies, there 
is a woeful lack of planning and allocated funding towards the maintenance and 
sustainability of these projects upon completion, with less than half of the study’s projects 
including an explicit provision of this type.  Perhaps the worst case scenario to come out of 
this oversight would be the gradual privatization of these project maintenance and 
sustainability mechanisms, as this would excuse the international institutions ultimately 
responsible for them from any real form of accountability. 
 Despite these numerous and serious issues with project implementation and 
accountability, the analysis of the data reveals a surprising, and perhaps unrealistic, self-
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reported degree of project success and positive implementation evaluation.  Over 60% of all 
projects reported accomplishing 100% of their stated goals as measured by their individual 
“success indicators”, and over 90% of all projects reported that their implementation was 
conducted at a “moderately satisfactory” or better level.  The clear discrepancy between these 
apparently positive project evaluations and the numerous aforementioned project challenges 
can be explained in part by the Bank’s problematic focus on “outputs”, rather than 
“outcomes” success indicators.  The issues surrounding this type of measurement are 
discussed at length in section 3.1.C and the Conclusion of this thesis.  Moreover, these 
findings point to the serious detachment on the part of the Bank between simply completing a 
prescribed project and actually effecting significant positive change in their target 
communities, especially when considering the sweeping under-budgeting and over-
committing already discussed in this section. 
 This issue, like many of the structural issues identified in this section, is of course not 
solely the responsibility of the World Bank.  Instead, they are symptomatic of greater 
contradictions and trends within the liberal development paradigm, as discussed in section 
1.2 and the conclusion of this thesis. 
Conclusions: A Way Forward 
As one would expect, the extreme complexity, volatility, and ever-evolving nature of 
Afghanistan between 2001 and present day as an environment for development operations 
renders its analysis an extremely ambiguous and involved undertaking; evaluating the 
outcomes and derived degrees of success of rural infrastructural projects is more a matter of 
navigating semi-blindly through a fog-laden twilight expanse towards an uncertain horizon 
than the dogged march down an arduous but well-defined path.  As this study has shown, 
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each of the numerous facets of the state’s security situation, political legitimacy situation, 
political economic condition, and position in the international community with regard to aid 
flows have worked in confluence with one another to produce these challenging conditions 
for development and its subsequent analysis.  The resulting situation, coupled with a battery 
of structural contradictions within the contemporary development apparatus itself, generates 
the unique conditions observed in each of the case studies presented herein. 
The considerable impact of the 2001 coalition invasion of Afghanistan and the 
subsequent (and ongoing) occupation drastically altered the social and economic landscape 
of the state, not only ousting the Taliban from political power but also setting into motion an 
insurgency that would go on to necessitate the longest military operation in United States 
history to suppress.  The power vacuum caused by the fall of the Taliban government and the 
establishment of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan that took its place 
resulted in persistent issues of bureaucratic and fiscal corruption and governmental 
illegitimacy that continue to adversely impact the state’s domestic institutional capacities.  
These governance problems, coupled with historically pervasive challenges to Afghanistan’s 
positive economic growth, such as the state’s minimal exports-based revenue and extreme 
reliance of much of the rural population on the illicit production of opiates, have severely 
hampered any progress towards the establishment of a stable and self-sustaining economy.  
The extreme magnitude of monetary aid flowing into the state has, to some counterintuitive 
degree, exacerbated Afghanistan’s reliance on the international community as it has become 
largely dependent on the continued disbursement of donor funds and credits to maintain its 
still-growing government.   
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All of these factors lend themselves to the critical importance of further developing 
Afghanistan’s rural access infrastructure.  This is because adequate rural access is a 
necessary prerequisite to regional economic integration, without which licit agricultural, 
livestock, and other industries have little hope of competing with the lucrative but illicit 
opiate sharecropping industry.  Additionally, improved roadway access promises significant 
improvement to rural quality and longevity of life through connecting the populace with 
social infrastructure such as educational and medical facilities. 
The successful implementation of these rural access development ventures is, 
however, not merely a matter of accounting for and mitigating the challenges posed by the 
operational environment of Afghanistan, but also of successfully navigating the numerous 
problematic and contradictory structures that comprise modern development itself.  The 
substantial historical consensus by international development institutions such as the World 
Bank along neoliberal economic lines, in addition to the problems of institutional inertia and 
goal overpromising that tend to characterize such large development organizations, makes it 
difficult for complex cases such as Afghanistan to be appropriately and effectively engaged 
with on an individualized rather than an algorithmic basis.  Furthermore, the societal-
alteration emphasis of the liberal intervention paradigm that underpins modern development 
operations conducted by these kinds of institutions is often responsible for reifying or even 
exacerbating the very social phenomena of “underdevelopment” they attempt to address.  
Finally, the increasingly distinct amalgamation of development and warfare operations 
though modern counterinsurgency doctrine produces a situation in which the pursuit of state 
rehabilitation and state security undermine the effectiveness of one another. 
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All of these factors affected observable and predominantly negative outcomes on the 
four case studies analyzed here, from the National Emergency Employment Program, the 
National Emergency Employment Program for Rural Access, the National Emergency Rural 
Access Program, to the ongoing Afghanistan Rural Access Program.  Among the most 
noteworthy and persistent of these challenges were deteriorating security situations, 
inadequate domestic governmental capacities, difficulties securing local population 
employment in the face of the competing opiate industry, trouble determining the most 
effective and appropriate ways to involve locals in project implementation and leadership, 
and recurring problems with determining the most accurate and apposite means of measuring 
project outcomes and success.   
Out of these challenges and the World Bank’s responses to them, three interesting 
observations can be distilled, each of which has important implications for rural access 
development in Afghanistan, and really for development at large.  First, and admittedly the 
weakest of these three observations, is the apparent selection of rural access project target 
locations based not on relative levels of regional poverty, but instead based on the proximity 
to security-significant locations and counterinsurgency operational hubs (IDA 2012, p. 10).  
There is extremely little material published by the Bank to implicate them in this relationship 
to COIN operations.  However, a cursory examination of NERAP project sites (see appendix 
10) and Provincial Reconstruction Team deployments (see appendix 11) does depict them as 
concentrating in many of the same areas, particularly around the provincial and state capitols 
of Afghanistan.  While the structural dangers of this kind of policy integration has already 
been discussed at length in section 1.3 of this thesis, its continued manifestation in 
Afghanistan is problematic not only because of the adverse effects it may eventually have on 
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development success, but also because Afghanistan will likely act as an operational template 
for COIN and development operations for years to come.  
Second is the persistent reluctance of the World Bank to engage directly with social 
development on the community level throughout the process of the provision of rural access 
infrastructure.  This is demonstrated in the realignment of NEEP and NEEPRA away from an 
emphasis on rural population employment and financial empowerment towards a strict focus 
on the provision of roadways via enterprise contracting.  While it is true that even after this 
change the ultimate goal of these projects remained focused on the improvement of rural 
social conditions, albeit indirectly through increasing access to social services and trade 
opportunities, this shift still represents a serious missed opportunity on the Bank’s part to 
have engaged with a large portion of the population in a positive and empowering way early 
on in the development process.  Thankfully, the Bank returned some element of its original 
community focus with ARAP’s inclusion of CDC’s and village Shura of elders in the project 
planning process, but not until almost 10 years had elapsed after rural access development 
had commenced. 
Finally, and most importantly, the contradictory and fascinating disparity among 
these projects between their self-reported degrees of completion or success and the multitude 
of challenges, or more critically, failures that each of them seems to exhibit.  How is it that 
these projects can, on average, report rates of success and completion in excess of 100% 
while still displaying significant or even crippling degrees of operational inefficiency 
towards their stated goals, nearly all of which explicitly purport to directly impact society 
through poverty reduction or economic integration?  The answer likely lies in the Bank’s 
own internal inconsistencies with regard to the selection of progress indicators: is there 
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sufficient covariance between “outputs” measurements and positive societal change to justify 
their use?  This is not a safe assumption to make.  Even the increased use of “outcomes” 
indicators, given their increased difficulty and obscurity of proper measurement, may not be 
sufficient in determining the actual impact of rural infrastructural development on something 
as complex as poverty reduction or rural agricultural diversity.  A third party review of Bank 
operations found that after roadways were completed 
Positive but often insignificant effects were recorded on consumption. Such 
effects were stronger among the poorest 30 percent in the sample.  Off-farm 
activity increased for both men and women; but this was also observed among 
control villages.  The number of mothers who gave birth with a medically 
assisted delivery increased (but so did mothers in the ‘control’ villages).  
(NERAP 2014, p. 13). 
 
If not even “outcomes”, which unquestionably more directly attempt to assess social impacts 
than “outputs”, are unable to significantly measure variance between control and 
experimental groups then one of two things are occurring: either more accurate means of 
measuring impacts must be determined, or these programs are in fact having a null effect on 
the societies they are targeting.  Because the latter option is a frightening one to consider, it is 
imperative that continued emphasis be placed on determining more accurate systems of 
measuring project impacts in the future.  There are already a number of well documented and 
researched means of increasing the poverty mitigation impacts of rural access development, 
such as maximizing road densities (broadening access), ensuring periodic maintenance, the 
provision of functional regulatory systems, the availability of affordable transportation, and a 
standardization system for new construction, many of which the Work Bank is already 
incorporating into their projects (ADB 2008, p. 34).  However, none of these strategies 
ultimately matter if their effects cannot be observed and recorded under controlled 
experimental rigors.  
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It is interesting given these varied and significant operational issues that the 
international aid community at large and the World Bank in particular would continue to 
work in Afghanistan and other states like it at such great cost.  No doubt, a major reason for 
this persistence is the sincere desire on the part of these institutions to affect positive societal 
and economic change through their notions of “development”.  Why then, given this apparent 
sincerity, would these institutions continue to engage in inefficient at best, or harmful at 
worst, development practices within their theaters of operation? As has already been 
discussed at some length in section 1.2, the significant impingement of the geopolitics of 
development institutions’ major donors (such as the United States) on their operational and 
doctrinal practices often, and certainly in the case of Afghanistan, detrimentally warp 
development efforts and outcomes.  This also explains to a large degree the tendency of 
development institutions to “oversell” their project goals. 
In light of all of this, the international community is currently being forced to contend 
with the fact that contemporary forms of “development” aid are, at the very least in part, 
flawed.  As has been shown, despite great economic investment and bold iterative attempts 
on the part of the international community to improve development outcomes, Afghanistan 
continues to be economically and politically vulnerable.  Is Afghanistan, then, a lost cause, 
and should the international community have involved itself so heavily in the first place?  
Consider the counterfactual case in which the international community declines to intercede 
in the wake of the 2001 coalition invasion of the state: the likelihood that the country avoids 
complete economic collapse in the resulting post-Taliban political power vacuum is minimal 
at best.  Likewise, should the 2001 invasion itself been avoided, the state could possibly still 
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be under Taliban rule, which has been established to be one of the most repressive regimes in 
recent history (see section 2.1). 
Given these provisions, it would seem that the current states of affairs in 
Afghanistan’s economic and social progression are far from a worst case scenario despite the 
numerous challenges and issues faced along the way.  The international community must 
contend with the fact that these mistakes have already been made, and make an aggressive 
attempt to correct and prevent them in the future.  As this thesis has illustrated, the 
foundation for these development aid reforms lies in the definitive separation of aid goals and 
operations from military ones, the comprehensive improvement of aid goals and success 
indicators, and the commitment by the international aid community in facilitating domestic 
institutional agency and leadership in establishing and realizing these goals. 
 The continued research of Afghanistan’s rural infrastructural development, to include 
its common challenges and their successful mitigation strategies as well as effective means of 
measuring project impact propensity and success, is vital.  Afghanistan will likely serve as a 
baseline for international “post conflict” development operations for years to come, making 
its thorough scholarly analysis an invaluable asset to future generations.    
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Appendix 
Appendix Figure 1 (Source Observatory of Economic Complexity. 
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/explore/tree_map/hs/export/afg/all/show/2012/)
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Appendix Figure 2 (Source World Bank Group: World Development Indicators) 
 
Appendix Figure 3 (Source World Bank Group: World Development Indicators)
 
Appendix Figure 4 (Source World Bank Group: World Development Indicators) 
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Appendix Figure 5: Mineral availability in Afghanistan (Source United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) (2013) Natural Resource Management and Peacebuilding in 
Afghanistan, Map 6, p. 37)
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Appendix Figure 6: Development of National Rural Access Projects (Source Word Bank 
(2009) Implementation Completion and Results Report: National Emergency Employment 
Program (TF-50973) (NEEP ICRR)) 
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Appendix Figure 7: NEEP I Project Map (Source IBRD 37438 Map of NEEP I (2009), In 
Word Bank (2009) Implementation Completion and Results Report: National Emergency 
Employment Program (NEEP) (Report No: ICR00001220)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 
 
Appendix Figure 8: Afghanistan’s Security Situation (Source Word Bank (2014) 
Implementation Completion and Results Report: National Emergency Rural Access Project 
(NERAP) (Report No: ICR3021), p.33) 
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Appendix Figure 9: List of World Bank projects and associated reports included in section 
3.2 analyses. 
 
95 
 
Appendix Figure 10: NERAP Project Map (Source Word Bank (2014) Implementation 
Completion and Results Report: National Emergency Rural Access Project (NERAP) (Report 
No: ICR3021)) 
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Appendix Figure 11: NATO PRT Locations (Source NATO ISAF (2008) Afghanistan: 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), 
(NATO: SITCEN Geo Section and Public Diplomacy Division), 
http://nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/maps/graphics/afghanistan_prt.jpg) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
